In Re Appeal of Rumsey, 59 A.3d 730

Charlotte Rumsey, 74, lives alone and seeks Choices for Care benefits to stay at home; needs supervision for toilet use, mobility, bathing, dressing, and personal hygiene.
DAIL initially denied highest or high-need CFC eligibility after an in-home assessment; found no need for meal prep or medication management help.
Rumsey appealed to the Vermont Human Services Board; an evidentiary hearing occurred before a hearing officer on June 30, 2011.
Board ultimately tied on the vote to adopt the hearing officer’s recommended decision; the Board then stated the Department’s original decision stands.
Rumsey moved to reopen for a seven-member decision and for full Board findings; the Board denied the motion, citing delay and the tie.
This appeal questions (a) whether Krupp-based recitations render insufficient findings, (b) whether a tie vote produced a final decision, and (c) whether proper CFC eligibility findings were made.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did the Board’s tie vote produce a valid decision under § 1 V.S.A. 172?	Rumsey argues the tie vote produced no valid decision and required remand for a full seven-member ruling.	DAIL contends the tie upholds the Board’s original decision as the controlling result.	Remand for a proper seven-member decision.
Whether the Board relied on Krupp-type findings of fact invalidly recited rather than proper findings.	Rumsey asserts the Board’s findings are Krupp recitations lacking independent fact findings.	Rumsey contends Krupp findings undermine the statutory requirement for findings.	Remand for proper, non-Krupp findings of fact.
Did the Board fail to make required findings on highest/high-need eligibility elements?	Rumsey claims missing findings on critical need, safety impact, and special circumstances.	DAIL argues these are conclusions of law not subject to independent findings given the tie.	Remand for proper findings addressing eligibility standards.
Was the Board’s action an actual decision, given the tie and absence of majority voting?	Rumsey contends no valid decision was rendered due to lack of majority.	DAIL maintains the Board acted but the majority rule was not met due to the tie.	Remand and reconsideration consistent with § 172.

Krupp v. Krupp, 126 Vt. 511 (1967) (recitations of evidence are not findings of fact)
In re M.G., 2010 VT 101 (2010) (reversed when Krupp-type findings relied upon)
In re E.C., 2010 VT 50 (2010) (identified key factual recitations as Krupp findings)
In re Hale Mountain Fish & Game Club, Inc., 2007 VT 102 (2007) (discusses need for underlying findings when conclusions follow from facts)
In re Reynolds, 170 Vt. 352 (2000) (majority vote required by 1 V.S.A. § 172 for action)
In re Villeneuve, 167 Vt. 450 (1998) (remedies involving reversal and remand for new vote when board can comply)
In re Newton Enterprises, 167 Vt. 459 (1998) (board decision requires written decision with sufficient votes; not merely contingent on presence)
In re Lakatos, 2007 VT 114 (2007) (allows board members to participate via transcript/recording when needed)
In re 66 North Main Street, 145 Vt. 1 (1984) (decision not rendered by majority is no decision)
In Lionni, 160 Vt. 625 (1993) (review of non-decision on direct appeal)