95 F. Supp. 3d 419
S.D.N.Y.2015Background
- In 2013 multiple antitrust suits alleging aluminum price-imp affecting Midwest Premium were centralized in this MDL.
- Initial dismissals in 2014 excluded indirect purchasers for lack of antitrust standing; remaining plaintiffs sought to amend via TAC and JAC.
- The TAC asserts §1 claims against Goldman Sachs entities, JPMorgan entities, Glencore entities, and related warehouses; JAC is Mag, Agfa, Kodak's complaint.
- Plaintiffs allege a cross-entity conspiracy between financial firms and LME-approved warehouses to depress load-outs and raise the Midwest Premium to profit trading activities.
- The court finds the JAC and TAC plead plausible §1 claims (and related state-law claims) but §2 claims are deficient for the FLPs, and some state-law claims are dismissed.
- Discovery was ordered to proceed; the court expressly denies total dismissal of any defendant and grants amendments for certain claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Antitrust standing and injury requirement | Plaintiffs allege injury in fact and antitrust injury tied to Midwest Premium manipulation. | Defendants argue standing and injury are inadequately pled and too indirect. | Antitrust standing plausibly alleged; injury to competitive process shown |
| Concerted action sufficiency under §1 | Plaintiffs plead a web of agreements across entities showing a conspiracy. | Argues insufficient evidence of agreement; too much reliance on parallel conduct. | Plausible inference of agreement supported; not merely parallel conduct |
| Market definition and rule of reason analysis | Markets include primary aluminum and LME-certified warehouse services; alleged impact on Midwest Premium is actionable. | Markets inadequately defined; pleadings rely on novel theory not tailored to traditional markets. | Pleadings establish plausible markets for rule-of-reason framework at this stage |
| Section 2 monopolization claim viability | FLPs allege Metro and affiliates monopolize LME warehouse services and inflate Midwest Premium. | Claim not plausible; injuries not properly tied to a single market; lack standing. | §2 claim against FLPs dismissed; §1 claims may proceed |
| State-law claims and preemption/analysis | NY Donnelly Act, California Cartwright Act, Michigan MARA pled similarly to Sherman Act §1 claims. | State-law claims duplicative or inadequately pled; unjust enrichment improperly predicated. | Some state-law claims dismissed; Donnelly Act and Cartwright Act withstand to extent aligned with §1 claims; unjust enrichment preserved to extent not predicated on dismissed claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (antitrust injury principle: protection of competition, not competitors)
- Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (single integrated entity doctrine; requires independent centers of decision-making for §1 conspiracy)
- Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard; parallel conduct alone insufficient)
- Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading must contain factual content; facial plausibility required)
- AGC v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983) (AGC factors for antitrust standing)
- McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982) (antitrust injury where injury is intertwined with conspiracy objective)
- American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, 560 U.S. 183 (2010) (affiliates and independence of decision-making in §1 context)
- State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (rule of reason framework; market definition prerequisite)
- Paycom Billing Servs. v. MasterCard Int’l, 467 F.3d 283 (2006) (antitrust pleading and damages considerations under Rule 12(b)(6))
- Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961) (geographic market considerations)