In re AL. P
2017 IL App (4th) 170435
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- Four children were adjudicated neglected in March 2016 and placed in DCFS guardianship; State later petitioned to terminate parental rights as to all four.
- Respondent (mother) stipulated to unfitness at the February 2017 fitness hearing based on failure to make reasonable progress; court found her unfit.
- At the May 2017 best-interest hearing, evidence showed respondent had ongoing alcohol problems and domestic-violence involvement; the oldest child, St. J., had lived with a foster family since December 2016 and formed attachments there.
- After both sides rested, the trial court asked for additional testimony from the children’s therapist about whether St. J. would accept adoption; the court continued the hearing and later allowed the guardian ad litem to reopen proof and call the therapist over respondent’s objection.
- Therapist testified St. J. wanted to remain with and would be willing to be adopted by the foster family; the trial court found termination of respondent’s parental rights as to St. J. was in his best interest and entered judgment terminating parental rights.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Respondent) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court violated due process by requesting and receiving additional evidence after parties rested | Court may reopen proofs to gather evidence bearing on child’s welfare; Juvenile Court Act permits court‑initiated continuances to receive more evidence | Reopening after State rested violated respondent’s due process and shifted burden to parent; if State couldn’t prove best interest, termination should not be granted | Court did not violate due process; reopening was authorized, neutral, and intended to find truth, not to advocate for State |
| Whether termination as to St. J. was against the manifest weight of the evidence (best interest) | Evidence of respondent’s continued alcohol/domestic violence, foster family’s stability, child’s willingness to be adopted showed termination served child’s need for permanence | St. J. expressed preference to live with respondent; termination undermines parent–child relationship | Court’s best-interest finding was not against manifest weight: child’s need for permanence and foster family stability justified termination |
Key Cases Cited
- In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347 (State bears preponderance burden at best-interest stage under Adoption Act)
- In re Jay H., 395 Ill. App. 3d 1063 (best-interest hearings may admit all evidence helpful to court; structural equivalent to dispositional hearing)
- In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d 1 (overriding purpose of Juvenile Court Act is best interests of minor, family, and community)
- People v. Kuntz, 239 Ill. App. 3d 587 (trial court may reopen proofs but must not become advocate)
- People v. Ruppel, 303 Ill. App. 3d 885 (factors for reopening proofs: inadvertence, surprise/prejudice, importance of evidence, reasons to deny)
- In re T.A., 359 Ill. App. 3d 953 (parental interest yields to child’s interest in stable, loving home)
- In re O.S., 364 Ill. App. 3d 628 (due process in termination proceedings requires compliance with Juvenile Court Act and fundamental fairness)