In re Adrianna S.
520 S.W.3d 548
Tenn. Ct. App.2016Background
- Father (Earnest B.) was sentenced to concurrent 15-year and 4-year terms in 2011 (eligible for parole in 2017); child Adrianna was born April 15, 2012 (after sentencing).
- DCS removed Adrianna (and her half-sister) from Mother in Feb 2014 for neglect/substance/mental-health concerns; children were placed in foster care and remained there.
- DCS petitioned to terminate parental rights (May 11, 2015); Mother's rights were terminated (unappealed). DCS sought termination of Father under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6).
- Father had no meaningful in-person relationship with Adrianna (only letters/gifts); the foster family cared for Adrianna’s special needs and sought to adopt; keeping siblings together was an important consideration.
- Juvenile court found (1) § 36-1-113(g)(6) applies to a child in utero at the time of sentencing, (2) clear-and-convincing grounds existed, and (3) termination was in the child’s best interests; this appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Father’s Argument | DCS’s / State’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether “child” in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6) includes a fetus in utero at the time of parent’s sentencing | Statute requires a “child” under eight at sentencing; Adrianna was unborn then, so § 36-1-113(g)(6) does not apply | “Child” should be read to include in utero for this termination ground (statutes in pari materia and purpose support inclusion) | The court held “child” includes a fetus in utero for § 36-1-113(g)(6) and the statute applied |
| Whether applying § 36-1-113(g)(6) here is unconstitutional (strict scrutiny / not narrowly tailored) | Application would be unconstitutional; this argument was raised late and should have been considered | Statute is presumed constitutional; Father waived the constitutional challenge by not timely raising it in trial court | Court affirmed waiver of constitutional challenge and did not reach the merits |
| Whether DCS failed to make reasonable efforts to place the child with Father’s relatives (impacting best interests) | DCS did not adequately pursue relative placements, which weighs against termination | DCS made reasonable efforts (investigated multiple relatives; relatives were unsuitable or unable) | Court found DCS made reasonable efforts; best-interest factors support termination |
Key Cases Cited
- Keisling v. Keisling, 92 S.W.3d 374 (Tenn. 2002) (parents have a fundamental right to custody and control of their children)
- Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (U.S. 1982) (standard for terminating parental rights requires heightened proof)
- In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d 533 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015) (grounds and proof standards in termination proceedings)
- In re Benjamin M., 310 S.W.3d 844 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (prenatal conduct can be treated as affecting a “child” for purposes of abuse/termination statutes)
- In re Adoption of E.N.R., 42 S.W.3d 26 (Tenn. 2001) (constitutional challenges to § 36-1-113 must be timely raised or are waived)
- Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2000) (noting contentious nature of fetal/personhood issues; courts should ascertain legislative intent)
- In re Adoption of Angela E., 402 S.W.3d 636 (Tenn. 2013) (discussing statutory interpretation and burden of proof in parental termination matters)