In Re: Adoption of: L.B.M., A Minor
161 A.3d 172
| Pa. | 2017Background
- Children A.D.M. (b. 2007) and L.B.M. (b. 2011) were adjudicated dependent; a lawyer was appointed as guardian ad litem (GAL) under 42 Pa.C.S. § 6311 for dependency proceedings.
- Franklin County CYS filed involuntary termination of parental rights (TPR) petitions after the mother’s repeated incarcerations and loss of visitation; two TPR proceedings occurred (first denied as to mother; second resulted in termination).
- Mother moved to appoint independent counsel for the children under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a), arguing the GAL’s positions conflicted with the children’s expressed wishes.
- Trial court denied appointment, reasoning an attorney-GAL sufficed; the Superior Court affirmed; mother appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
- Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether § 2313(a)’s mandatory appointment of counsel in contested involuntary TPRs is satisfied when the appointed GAL is an attorney, and whether failure to appoint separate counsel is harmless error.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 2313(a) requires appointment of counsel in contested involuntary TPRs | Mother: the statute’s mandatory "shall appoint counsel" requires client-directed counsel distinct from a GAL | CYS/GAL: an attorney serving as GAL can satisfy the statute; statute contemplates either role in other proceedings | Held: § 2313(a) unambiguously mandates appointment of counsel to represent a child’s legal interests in contested TPRs |
| Whether an attorney-GAL may serve as the child’s statutorily required counsel in a contested TPR | Mother: GAL’s best-interests role differs from client-directed legal counsel and cannot substitute | GAL/CYS: continuity and dependency-role overlap make dual service practical and efficient | Held: dependency GAL should not simultaneously serve as the child’s TPR counsel because roles can conflict and create confusion; separate counsel required |
| Whether failure to appoint separate counsel is reversible error and standard of review | Mother: error requires a new hearing | GAL/CYS: error (if any) is harmless | Held: failure to appoint counsel is structural error (affecting trial framework) and not subject to harmless-error review; reversal and remand required |
| Whether In re K.M. (Pa. Super. 2012) remains good law | Mother: K.M. wrongly allowed attorney-GAL to satisfy § 2313(a) | CYS/GAL: K.M. supports no requirement for separate counsel where GAL is attorney | Held: K.M. is overruled to the extent it conflicts with this decision |
Key Cases Cited
- Gilbert v. Synagro Cent., LLC, 131 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2015) (statutory interpretation standard and de novo review)
- In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781 (Pa. Super. 2012) (Superior Court held an attorney-GAL could satisfy § 2313(a); overruled here to the extent inconsistent)
- In re Adoption of Hess, 562 A.2d 1375 (Pa. Super. 1989) (purpose of § 2313 to ensure advocacy devoted to child’s needs and welfare)
- In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817 (Pa. 2012) (best-interests standard in termination/adoption contexts)
- Commonwealth v. Baroni, 827 A.2d 419 (Pa. 2003) (structural error framework distinguishing errors affecting trial framework)