In re Adoption of Jayden G., 433 Md. 50

Background

Jayden G., born 2007, was placed in foster care at 16 months; he lived with the same foster family for ~27–33 months before TPR proceedings concluded.
The juvenile court changed Jayden’s permanency plan from reunification to adoption by non-relatives; Mother (Jennifer S.) appealed that CINA plan change to the Court of Special Appeals.
While the CINA appeal was pending, the Department filed a separate TPR (termination of parental rights) petition; the juvenile court denied Mother’s motion to stay the TPR and later terminated her parental rights.
The Court of Special Appeals reversed the permanency-plan change (vacated it) but affirmed the TPR; the Maryland Court of Appeals granted certiorari to resolve (1) whether the TPR should have been stayed pending the CINA appeal and (2) whether the juvenile court improperly relied on Jayden’s attachment to his foster parents.
The Court of Appeals held the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying the stay and did not err in considering Jayden’s attachment to foster parents when determining whether termination was in his best interests.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Mother)	Defendant's Argument (Dept./Child)	Held
1) Whether the juvenile court must stay TPR proceedings while an appeal of a permanency-plan change (to adoption) is pending	Mother: a stay is required because proceeding with TPR while the CINA appeal is pending could moot her right to meaningful review and frustrate her appeal	Dept: no categorical stay; 180-day TPR rule and child’s need for prompt permanency weigh against routine stays; child argued stays may be appropriate only in some cases	Held: No automatic stay required; decision to stay is discretionary and must be guided by the child’s best interests — court did not abuse discretion in denying stay here because delay would harm Jayden’s permanency prospects
2) Whether FL § 5‑319(a)’s 180‑day rule mandates denial of stays or dismissal if TPR exceeds 180 days	Mother: implied procedural protections require halting TPR until appeal resolved	Dept: 180‑day rule requires timely adjudication and disfavors delay	Held: The word “shall” is directory in context; §5‑319(a) encourages expedition but does not categorically bar stays or require automatic denial of stay motions
3) Whether the juvenile court erred by considering Jayden’s attachment to foster parents (and prospect of adoption) in deciding TPR	Mother: court improperly weighed foster attachment/adoptability as if adoptive placement were equivalent to parental rights	Dept/Child: child’s emotional ties and adjustment to placement are expressly relevant under FL §5‑323(d)(4)	Held: Permissible and required to consider the child’s emotional ties and adjustment; juvenile court properly weighed foster attachment among other statutory factors when determining best interests
4) Whether a finding of parental unfitness alone justifies termination of parental rights	Mother: termination should require both unfitness and that TPR serve child’s best interests; intermediate court treated unfitness as sufficient	Dept: argued unfitness supports TPR	Held: Unfitness overcomes parental presumption but does not automatically mandate termination; court must still evaluate FL §5‑323(d) factors and conclude termination is in the child’s best interests before granting TPR

Key Cases Cited

In re Damon M., 362 Md. 429 (2001) (permanency-plan changes to adoption are immediately appealable because they change the terms of custody and the level of services)
In re Karl H., 394 Md. 402 (2006) (reaffirming immediate appealability of plan changes and recognizing parallel CINA/TPR proceedings can render appeals moot)
In re Rashawn H., 402 Md. 477 (2007) (explaining parental-presumption framework: court must find unfitness or exceptional circumstances before terminating rights)
In re Emileigh F., 355 Md. 198 (1999) (juvenile court should not take action that defeats the effectiveness of a pending appeal where no statutory duty compels the action)
In re Deontay J., 408 Md. 152 (2009) (distinguishing prohibited action that defeats an appeal from permitted action that incidentally renders an appeal moot when action protects child’s welfare)
In re Ta’Niya C., 417 Md. 90 (2010) (the child’s best interest is the ultimate governing standard in TPR; statutory factors guide analysis)
In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99 (1994) (adoption is the route to permanency when reunification is not possible; TPR required before adoption without parental consent)
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (recognition of a parent’s fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children)
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (discussing historical and constitutional protection of parental decisionmaking)