In re Adoption of E.U., L.U.-1 and L.U.-2
20-0039
| W. Va. | Oct 13, 2021Background
- S.U. and C.J. were in a long-term intimate relationship and have four children conceived through assisted-reproduction methods; the parties disputed parental status and custody.
- S.U. claimed a prior custody agreement made C.J. a gestational surrogate only; the family court found that agreement unenforceable and designated C.J. the legal mother of all children.
- This Court (in S.U. I) affirmed the lower courts’ determinations that C.J. is the children’s legal mother and that she was entitled to custodial rights.
- Petitioners (S.U. and his spouse C.U.) later filed adoption petitions for three children asserting C.J.’s consent was not required because she is not the “biological” mother under the adoption statute.
- The circuit court denied the adoption petitions (and later denied a Rule 59(e) motion to vacate), holding C.J.’s consent was required and that res judicata/collateral estoppel and prior rulings barred reopening parental-rights issues; this Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether C.J.’s consent required for adoption under W. Va. Code §48-22-301(a)(3) | Petitioners: "birth mother" means "biological mother" under §48-22-106, so C.J. (non‑biological) need not consent | Respondent/Court: C.J. is the legal mother by prior adjudication; requiring her consent effectuates statutory purpose protecting a birth mother’s rights | Court: Consent required; literal reading would produce absurd result given prior determination that C.J. is legal mother |
| Whether res judicata/collateral estoppel bar relitigation of parental-rights/adoption | Petitioners: Adoption proceedings are separate and statute controls; issue can be relitigated | Respondent/Court: Parental-rights allocation and mother status were finally adjudicated; petitioners seek to reopen same dispute | Court: Bars apply; prior final adjudication precludes relitigation |
| Whether denial of adoption deprived petitioners of due process | Petitioners: Procedure denied them relief they claim statute allows | Respondent/Court: Prior adjudications settled rights and protections require mother’s consent; petitioners had remedies and prior appeals | Court: No due-process violation shown; prior rulings foreclose relief |
| Whether the circuit court erred in denying the Rule 59(e) motion to vacate | Petitioners: Motion properly sought relief from order denying adoptions and raised statute interpretation | Respondent/Court: Motion is subject to same standards as underlying judgment; issues were previously decided | Court: Motion properly treated as Rule 59(e) and denial affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Richardson v. Kennedy, 197 W. Va. 326, 475 S.E.2d 418 (1996) (motion filed within ten days is treated as a Rule 59(e) motion)
- McCormick v. Allstate Ins. Co., 197 W. Va. 415, 475 S.E.2d 507 (1996) (standard of review: abuse of discretion for disposition; clearly erroneous for factual findings)
- In re S.W., 236 W. Va. 309, 779 S.E.2d 577 (2015) (restating appellate standard of review for circuit-court findings and dispositions)
- Wickland v. Am. Travellers Life Ins. Co., 204 W. Va. 430, 513 S.E.2d 657 (1998) (appeal from a Rule 59(e) motion uses the same standard as the underlying judgment)
- Taylor-Hurley v. Mingo Cty. Bd. of Educ., 209 W. Va. 780, 551 S.E.2d 702 (2001) (absurd-results doctrine permits favoring a reasonable construction over a literal one when literal reading thwarts legislative purpose)