in Re Academy, Ltd. D/B/A Academy Sports + Outdoors
19-0497
| Tex. | Jun 25, 2021Background
- Plaintiffs sued Academy Sports + Outdoors after a third party purchased a firearm and used it to cause harm, asserting negligence, negligent hiring/training/supervision, gross negligence, and negligent-entrustment claims.
- Academy moved for summary judgment arguing the federal Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA) bars the claims; the trial court denied the motion.
- Academy sought mandamus relief in the Texas Supreme Court to compel dismissal.
- The PLCAA (15 U.S.C. §§ 7902–7903) generally bars “qualified civil liability actions” for harm from third‑party misuse of firearms but expressly excepts “actions against a seller for negligent entrustment” and provides a statutory definition of “negligent entrustment.”
- Justice Boyd concurred in the Court’s judgment to dismiss all claims, but wrote separately: he argues the PLCAA’s text and definition mean the negligent‑entrustment claim is not barred by the PLCAA, yet the claim fails under Texas common law because Texas does not recognize negligent‑entrustment claims based on sales.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the PLCAA bar the negligent‑entrustment claim? | The alleged facts match PLCAA’s statutory definition of "negligent entrustment," so the PLCAA exception applies and the claim is not barred. | The PLCAA exception does not create a federal cause of action; courts should ask whether state law recognizes negligent entrustment before applying the exception, and Texas does not. | Concurrence: PLCAA’s text and definition cover the pleaded claim, so PLCAA does not bar it; majority treated it as barred because Texas law does not recognize such a claim based on a sale. |
| May courts import state common‑law requirements into the PLCAA’s statutory definition? | The Act’s plain definition governs; courts must apply the statutory meaning rather than add state‑law requirements. | The Act does not create a cause of action, so state‑law viability is relevant to whether the exception saves the claim. | Held: Statutory definitions control; one cannot graft extra state‑law elements onto PLCAA’s defined terms (per concurrence). |
| Is negligent entrustment viable under Texas law when the product was sold (not loaned)? | (Plaintiffs) The facts as pleaded assert a seller who knew the buyer posed unreasonable risk, which should support a claim. | (Academy) Texas law refuses to extend negligent‑entrustment liability to sellers who have sold (relinquished control of) the item. | Held: Texas does not recognize negligent‑entrustment claims based on sales; the claim fails under state law, so dismissal was appropriate. |
Key Cases Cited
- Youngkin v. Hines, 546 S.W.3d 675 (Tex. 2018) (legislative definitions in a statute control its application; courts must follow statutory definitions).
- F.F.P. Operating Partners, L.P. v. Duenez, 237 S.W.3d 680 (Tex. 2007) (negligent‑entrustment liability rests on continued ownership/control—duty arises from the right to control).
- Rush v. Smitherman, 294 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1956) (rule that negligent‑entrustment doctrine does not apply where item is sold).
- TGS‑NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432 (Tex. 2011) (statutory usage binds courts when a statute assigns a particular meaning to a term).
- Cadena Comercial USA Corp. v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 518 S.W.3d 318 (Tex. 2017) (where a statute provides a definition, courts rely on that definition rather than substitute other meanings).