858 S.E.2d 873
W. Va.2021Background
- Infant A.P. was born exposed to buprenorphine; shortly after birth he was found unresponsive and life-flighted to the hospital. A petition for abuse and neglect was filed against mother J.K. and father M.P.
- J.K. stipulated to adjudication for neglect based on subjecting the child to a drug-endangered environment and substance abuse during pregnancy; DHHR assumed custody.
- A.P. died during the pendency of the proceedings (cause of death listed as "unknown"). The circuit court nevertheless granted J.K. a post-adjudicatory improvement period and later terminated her parental rights, citing lack of participation and relying on In re I.M.K.
- J.K. moved to dismiss the petition after the child’s death, arguing dispositional statutes apply only where the subject child remains alive; DHHR argued disposition and termination could proceed to protect future or other children.
- The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed: it held W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) does not permit termination of parental/custodial/guardianship rights as to a child who is deceased at the time of disposition and remanded with directions to dismiss the petition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (J.K.) | Defendant's Argument (DHHR) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) permits termination of parental rights to a child who died during the proceedings | Statute’s dispositional alternatives reference "the child" (definite article) and require the child’s welfare; a deceased child has no welfare to protect, so dismissal is required | I.M.K. permits continuing proceedings and disposition after a child’s death; termination can be used to protect other or future children and create "aggravated circumstances" | Held: § 49-4-604(c)(6) does not permit termination as to a deceased child; disposition presumes the subject child remains extant and petition must be dismissed post-adjudication when the only named child is dead |
| Whether In re I.M.K. authorizes disposition/termination postmortem | N/A (J.K. relied on statutory text) | I.M.K. shows adjudication and disposition serve to document and remedy conditions for future child safety; thus disposition can follow | Held: I.M.K. allows adjudication to proceed after death but does not extend to dispositive authority to terminate rights post-death; adjudication and disposition are distinct and disposition focuses on the living child’s needs |
Key Cases Cited
- In re I.M.K., 240 W. Va. 679, 815 S.E.2d 490 (W. Va. 2018) (adjudication may proceed despite death of subject child; purpose is to identify and document abuse/neglect conditions)
- In re S.W., 236 W. Va. 309, 779 S.E.2d 577 (W. Va. 2015) (standard of review: abuse of discretion for disposition; clearly erroneous for facts)
- Chrystal R. M. v. Charlie A. L., 194 W. Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (W. Va. 1995) (questions of law/statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
- In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (W. Va. 1980) (termination may be ordered without less restrictive alternatives when no reasonable likelihood conditions can be corrected)
- In re Willis, 157 W. Va. 225, 207 S.E.2d 129 (W. Va. 1973) (parental right to custody is a fundamental liberty interest)