In re A.M., 21-0108

Child A.M. injured when mother L.W. drove head‑on into a semi while under the influence; mother tested positive for methamphetamine, buprenorphine, and benzodiazepines and a meth pipe and meth were found in her vehicle.
L.W. stipulated to abuse/neglect, received a post‑adjudicatory improvement period beginning Jan 2020 with requirements including sobriety, random drug screens, inpatient/outpatient treatment, counseling, supervised visits, and honesty with DHHR/MDT.
L.W. attended multiple treatment programs (detox, inpatient, intensive outpatient), but repeatedly relapsed, violated program rules, attempted to cheat a drug screen, and concealed a Subutex prescription from counselors and DHHR.
The improvement period expired July 17, 2020; L.W. filed for an extension on Sept 29, 2020 (untimely) and alternatively sought a dispositional improvement plan/post‑dispositional period.
The circuit court denied the untimely extension, denied a post‑dispositional improvement period based on lack of likely full participation and dishonesty, and found no reasonable likelihood conditions could be corrected; it terminated L.W.’s parental rights on Jan 8, 2021.
The father successfully completed an improvement period and the child was reunified with him.

Issue	Petitioner’s Argument	DHHR/Circuit Court’s Argument	Held
1) Whether court erred by refusing to extend the post‑adjudicatory improvement period	L.W. argued she was entitled to an extension to continue progress	Extension motion filed after expiration; improvement period could not be continued and services post‑expiration were de facto only	Denial affirmed — motion untimely; no relief
2) Whether court erred by denying a post‑dispositional improvement period	L.W. claimed changed circumstances and current compliance (therapy, MAT, sponsor) made her likely to fully participate	Prior poor compliance, ongoing relapses, dishonesty, and failed treatment show she was unlikely to fully participate	Denial affirmed — court properly exercised discretion
3) Whether termination was improper because less‑restrictive alternatives weren’t used	L.W. argued termination was too drastic given ongoing services and child reunified with father	Termination permitted when no reasonable likelihood conditions can be corrected and child welfare requires it	Termination affirmed — no reasonable likelihood of correction; welfare of child required it
4) Whether child’s reunification with father prevents termination of mother’s rights	L.W. argued child’s placement with fit father made termination unnecessary	One parent’s fitness does not protect the other parent whose conduct endangers the child	Affirmed — mother’s misconduct justified termination despite father’s fitness

In re Tiffany Marie S., 196 W. Va. 223, 470 S.E.2d 177 (W. Va. 1996) (standard of review for circuit court findings in bench trials)
In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (W. Va. 2011) (courts need not pursue every speculative possibility of parental improvement)
In re M.M., 236 W. Va. 108, 778 S.E.2d 338 (W. Va. 2015) (discretion to grant or deny improvement periods)
In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 573 S.E.2d 354 (W. Va. 2002) (discretion to deny improvement period when no improvement likely)
In re B.H., 233 W. Va. 57, 754 S.E.2d 743 (W. Va. 2014) (best interests of the child control dispositional decisions)
In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (W. Va. 1980) (termination may be used without intermediate less‑restrictive alternatives when no reasonable likelihood of correction)