376 N.C. 99
N.C.2020Background
- Mother gave birth to Ann in July 2015 and was diagnosed with serious mental illnesses (including schizophrenia); DSS removed Ann at birth and placed her with foster parents (petitioners).
- Mother participated in services (parenting classes, assessments, counseling) and attended visits but continued to exhibit severe symptoms, deny illness, and demonstrate unsafe or inappropriate parenting behavior.
- Davidson County dependency proceedings resulted in appointment of the petitioners as Ann’s court-approved legal permanent guardians; guardians and Ann resided in Davie County.
- Petitioners (as legal permanent guardians) filed a petition in Davie County to terminate mother’s parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6) (dependency/incapacity) and (a)(7) (willful abandonment); the Davie County trial court granted termination on both grounds.
- On appeal the North Carolina Supreme Court held Davie County had subject-matter jurisdiction but reversed the termination: (1) § 7B-1111(a)(6) cannot be satisfied where the child resides with legal permanent guardians pursuant to a valid permanency order, and the trial court made no findings about availability of an alternative care arrangement; and (2) the record lacks findings or clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that mother willfully abandoned Ann under § 7B-1111(a)(7).
- Result: the termination order was reversed; guardianship status of petitioners was not disturbed by this ruling.
Issues
| Issue | Petitioners' Argument | Respondent's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subject-matter jurisdiction to hear termination petition filed in Davie County | Petitioners (guardians) filed where child resided; § 7B-1101 confers jurisdiction in that district | Respondent: Davidson County permanency order precluded another district from terminating rights; integrated juvenile case requires deference to original court | Court: Davie County had jurisdiction under § 7B-1101; prior permanency order did not deprive jurisdiction |
| Whether dependency under § 7B-1111(a)(6) supports termination | Mother is incapable of care and failed to identify any appropriate alternative child care arrangement | Mother: child resides with court-approved permanent guardians, so the statutory requirement (lack of appropriate alternative) cannot be met | Court: When a child resides with legal permanent guardians pursuant to a valid permanency order, § 7B-1111(a)(6) cannot be satisfied; trial court also failed to make required findings about availability of alternative arrangements, so (a)(6) vacated |
| Whether willful abandonment under § 7B-1111(a)(7) supports termination | Petitioners point to mother’s refusal of medication, missed/deficient parenting, and mental-health records during the six-month window | Mother: conduct stems from severe mental illness; evidence does not show deliberate intent to abandon or relinquish parental claims | Court: Trial court made no findings about the determinative six-month period or willful intent; record does not show clear, cogent, convincing evidence of willful abandonment; (a)(7) vacated |
Key Cases Cited
- In re J.A.E.W., 375 N.C. 112 (trial court may terminate parental rights based on adjudication of statutory grounds)
- In re E.B., 375 N.C. 310 (subject-matter jurisdiction is indispensable and distinct from dependency proceedings)
- In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. 588 (juvenile code aims to protect children while respecting family autonomy; challenges to jurisdiction may be raised at any time)
- In re K.L.T., 374 N.C. 826 (characterizing § 7B-1111(a)(6) as addressing availability or unavailability of alternative child care arrangements)
- In re C.B., 245 N.C. App. 197 (Court of Appeals holding that a parent’s affirmative steps to identify alternatives may be relevant to (a)(6))
- In re L.H., 210 N.C. App. 355 (parent must take steps to propose viable alternatives; placement alone does not automatically mean parent had an alternative)
- In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. 71 (willful abandonment requires proof of both actual abandonment and willful intent during the six-month window)
- In re Young, 346 N.C. 244 (insufficient findings or evidence require reversal of termination for lack of clear, cogent, and convincing proof)
- State v. McDowell, 329 N.C. 363 (statutory constructions that focus on objective availability rather than a litigant’s personal efforts)
- Hart v. Thomasville Motors, 244 N.C. 84 (void judgments and the centrality of subject-matter jurisdiction)
