In Re A.L.H.
M2016-01574-COA-R3-JV
| Tenn. Ct. App. | Aug 31, 2017Background
- Parents S.B. (mother) and R.H. (father) had three children. DCS referred the family after allegations of parental methamphetamine use and a report that a child burned her hand on a meth pipe.
- Hair-follicle testing on August 27, 2015: two children (A.G.B., 19 months; A.R.B., 5 months) tested positive for methamphetamine; the third child (A.L.H.) tested negative. A later November test showed all children negative.
- Parents stipulated that the children were dependent and neglected but reserved the issue of "severe child abuse." The juvenile court found A.G.B. and A.R.B. were victims of severe child abuse; the trial court affirmed by clear and convincing evidence.
- The trial court based its severe-abuse finding on postnatal exposure to methamphetamine while the children were in the care or control of mother and/or father and on parents’ knowledge of drug use in the household.
- Parents appealed, arguing (among other points) lack of proof as to who exposed the children, absence of expert causation testimony, no specific serious bodily injury shown, and that one sibling’s negative test undercuts the finding.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding exposure itself can constitute severe child abuse under Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102(b)(22)(A)(i) and that an expert opinion is not required under that statutory subsection.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (DCS) | Defendant's Argument (Parents) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether exposure to methamphetamine supports a finding of severe child abuse | Exposure to illicit drugs while in parents’ care satisfies the statutory definition of severe abuse and threatens serious bodily injury/death | Parents argued lack of proof of who, how, when, or how much exposure occurred and no proof of specific injury or causation | Court held postnatal drug exposure of A.G.B. and A.R.B. by those in their care/support sufficed to find severe child abuse under § 37-1-102(b)(22)(A)(i) by clear and convincing evidence |
| Whether an expert opinion was required to find severe child abuse from drug exposure | Not required under subsection (A)(i); legislature expressly required experts in a different subsection (B) but not (A) | Parents contended expert testimony was needed to link exposure to likelihood of serious bodily injury or death | Court held subsection (A)(i) does not require expert opinion and the statute’s text and legislative intent support that conclusion |
| Whether absence of specific identified serious bodily injury defeats a severe abuse finding | Statute’s listed examples are non-exhaustive; the focus is exposure likely to cause serious harm, not proof of a listed injury | Parents asserted DCS failed to prove specific injury or likelihood of particular severe injuries | Court held specific listed injury is not required; exposure itself can meet the statutory standard when supported by evidence of parents’ knowledge or failure to protect |
| Whether inconsistent test results (one sibling negative) or lack of proof of methamphetamine manufacture undermine the finding | Negative test for one sibling or lack of evidence of manufacturing does not negate positive tests for the two children or the statutory basis for severe abuse | Parents argued inconsistent results and no manufacturing evidence weaken causation and severity findings | Court held sibling’s negative test and absence of evidence of manufacture are not dispositive; positive tests for two infants plus parental knowledge/failure to protect sustain the finding |
Key Cases Cited
- Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685 (Tenn. 2013) (standard of appellate review for bench trials)
- In re S.J., 387 S.W.3d 576 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (definition and burden for clear and convincing evidence in juvenile proceedings)
- In re H.L.F., 297 S.W.3d 223 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (definition of "knowing" in parental conduct)
- In re Benjamin M., 310 S.W.3d 844 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (statutory purpose to protect children from present and future harms)
- In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d 533 (Tenn. 2015) (use of expressio unius to discern legislative intent)
- State v. Hawk, 170 S.W.3d 547 (Tenn. 2005) (courts must give effect to legislative purpose and ordinary meaning of statutory text)