2019 Ohio 90
Ohio Ct. App.2019Background
- Jarvis Bateman (plaintiff) filed a juvenile-court complaint for custody of A.B. and B.B., alleging he was their biological father and attaching an affidavit; parties never married and no prior custody orders existed.
- Multiple hearings occurred: mother Gina Sufronko appeared pro se at earlier hearings, had positive drug screens, and repeatedly said she had consulted/retained counsel who never entered an appearance.
- Final hearing (April 19, 2018): Sufronko did not appear; deputy clerk confirmed notice had been mailed and nothing was returned; magistrate proceeded and treated the matter as a default in favor of Bateman.
- Magistrate’s signed entry awarded Bateman full custody, limited mother’s parenting time to his sole discretion, and ordered tax dependency claims — but made no on-the-record best-interests-of-the-child findings.
- Mother later moved to set aside the judgment and for paternity testing; magistrate denied relief. On appeal, the appellate court addressed (1) whether juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because paternity was unestablished, and (2) whether mother was denied due process (notice/right to counsel).
- Court of Appeals: overruled mother’s jurisdiction and due-process challenges, but sua sponte reversed and remanded because the trial court made an initial custody award between two parents without making statutory/best-interest findings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Bateman) | Defendant's Argument (Sufronko) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Did juvenile court have subject-matter jurisdiction to decide custody when paternity was not established? | Court has jurisdiction to decide custody upon a putative father’s complaint where he participated in nurturing and mother admitted or did not dispute paternity. | Because Bateman was only a putative father (no presumption of paternity), court lacked jurisdiction to assign parental rights. | Held: Court had subject-matter jurisdiction (Byrd and Mosier guidance); Appellant’s argument overruled. |
| 2) Was mother deprived of due process by denial of counsel / lack of notice / inability to be heard? | Bateman: mother was repeatedly informed of right to counsel, had opportunities to appear, and had notice of hearings; she failed to secure counsel or appear at final hearing. | Sufronko: was denied effective representation; did not receive proper notice of final hearing; thus deprived of due process. | Held: No due-process violation shown — service by mail was presumed, mother appeared at prior hearings and did not request appointed counsel; magistrate’s denial of continuance was not an abuse of discretion. |
| 3) Did the trial court err substantively in granting custody by default without findings? | (Implicit) Default could resolve custody when other parent absent. | Judgment awarded custody without applying statutory best-interest standard or making findings. | Held: Trial court erred sua sponte — initial custody determinations between parents require best-interest analysis; judgment reversed and remanded for further proceedings. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Byrd, 66 Ohio St.2d 334 (Ohio 1981) (putative father who participated in child’s nurturing and whose paternity is admitted has equality of standing with mother; custody decided by best interests of the child)
- State ex rel. Mosier v. Fornof, 126 Ohio St.3d 47 (Ohio 2010) (juvenile court does not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to decide custody when a putative father files a custody complaint)
- Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (U.S. 2000) (parents have a fundamental liberty interest in care, custody, and control of their children under the Due Process Clause)
- Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (U.S. 1950) (due process requires notice reasonably calculated to inform interested parties of proceedings)