in Interest of A.M, 2021 CO 14

Background

A.M. tested positive for heroin at birth; both parents tested positive for illegal drugs and the child was adjudicated dependent and neglected. Parents were given court-approved treatment plans.
The People moved to terminate both parents’ rights for noncompliance, parental unfitness, and an unlikely likelihood of change; they alleged no viable modifications or less drastic alternatives existed and that termination was in the child’s best interests.
The trial court initially found termination was in A.M.’s best interests but denied the motion because permanent custody with the aunt was a less drastic alternative; the People appealed.
On first appeal the court of appeals reversed and remanded for the trial court to determine whether permanent custody (an APR to the aunt) was in the child’s best interests or whether termination was preferable.
On remand the trial court again found termination provided greater permanence and terminated parental rights; a divided court of appeals reversed, adopting an “adequacy” standard (denying termination if a less drastic alternative adequately meets the child’s needs).
The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the court of appeals, holding that the best‑interests standard governs, express less‑drastic findings are not required, and the court of appeals substituted its judgment for the trial court’s factual findings.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a trial court must deny termination when a less‑drastic alternative "adequately" meets the child’s needs (adequacy vs. best‑interests)	Adequacy should bar termination if APR adequately meets child’s physical, mental, emotional needs.	Best interests of the child is the controlling standard; adequacy is too low and inconsistent with precedent.	Rejected adequacy. Trial courts must apply the child’s best interests as primary; less‑drastic alternatives must also be assessed under best interests.
Whether trial courts must make express findings that no less‑drastic alternative exists before terminating rights	Mandatory explicit finding protects parental liberty and ensures termination is last resort.	Consideration/elimination of alternatives is implicit in statutory criteria; express findings not required.	Not required. It is better practice to make express findings, but due process is satisfied so long as statutory criteria are applied and findings are supported.
Whether the court of appeals substituted its judgment for the trial court (standard of review)	N/A (People appealed the trial court’s initial denial of termination).	Trial court’s factual findings are entitled to deference and should be reversed only if clearly erroneous.	Court of appeals applied incorrect legal standard and substituted its judgment; Colorado Supreme Court reversed and reinstated deference to trial court findings.
Whether the best‑interests standard violates parental due process and requires a stricter rule	Best‑interests is subjective; inadequately protects parental liberty—so adequacy required to guard against erroneous termination.	Once parental unfitness is shown by clear and convincing evidence, the child’s interests may outweigh parental liberty; best‑interests standard satisfies due process.	Best‑interests standard satisfies due process; adequacy is not required to protect parental rights.

Key Cases Cited

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (U.S. 1982) (parents’ liberty interest and requirement of clear and convincing proof for termination)
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (U.S. 2000) (parental liberty interest in childrearing)
People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108 (Colo. 1986) (trial court must consider and reject less‑drastic alternatives; does not endorse an adequacy standard)
C.S. v. People, 83 P.3d 627 (Colo. 2004) (consideration/elimination of less‑drastic alternatives is implicit in statutory termination criteria)
People in Interest of L.D., 671 P.2d 940 (Colo. 1983) (termination decisions may be based on children’s best interests and differences among parents/children)
People in Interest of J.M.B., 60 P.3d 790 (Colo. App. 2002) (best interests govern termination and permanent placement decisions)
People in Interest of A.M.D., 648 P.2d 625 (Colo. 1982) (once unfitness is proven, child’s interests may outweigh parental liberty)