2020 COA 154
Colo. Ct. App.2020Background
- June 2017: Adams County Human Services removed A.A. (7) and E.A. (5) and filed dependency/neglect petitions alleging parental methamphetamine use, domestic violence, and neglect; children were adjudicated dependent/neglected and court‑approved treatment plans were entered.
- Early orders required supervised family visitation at least twice weekly and regular phone contact; the Department largely failed to provide in‑person visits after removal.
- A magistrate later suspended all parental visitation unless each parent demonstrated two weeks of monitored sobriety; mother never cleared that threshold and received no in‑person visits.
- Father met sobriety briefly and resumed visits, but visits with E.A. and A.A. were later discontinued without the Department obtaining therapeutic visitation or other intermediate services; father entered then left an inpatient program and received no Department referrals for alternative treatment.
- A.A. spent months in residential treatment and required day treatment and continued therapeutic services for a safe step‑down, but the Department did not secure the recommended services or funding; children experienced multiple disruptive placement moves.
- Eighteen months after adjudication the juvenile court terminated both parents’ rights; the Court of Appeals reversed, holding the Department failed to exercise reasonable reunification efforts (visitation and services) and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Department made "reasonable efforts" to reunify by providing visitation | Parents: complete denial/suspension of visitation unlawfully deprived statutorily required services and impeded reunification | Department: visitation restrictions were necessary to protect children given parental substance use and toxicity | Court: reversal — complete suspension without evidence that total denial was necessary violated reasonable‑efforts requirement; visitation should have been provided or scaled (e.g., supervised/therapeutic) |
| Delegation of visitation decisions to Department/GAL | Father: court improperly delegated visitation determinations to the Department/GAL, resulting in limited contact | Department/GAL: their recommendations were appropriate based on observed behavior and child welfare | Court: error where delegation led to total loss of services and no showing alternatives were considered; reversed as to related termination findings (some delegation claims not separately addressed) |
| Whether Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate father (substance‑use treatment) | Father: Department failed to refer/pay for alternative treatment after he left a long inpatient program, forcing a Hobson’s choice and impeding reunification | Department: expected completion of inpatient program; sober‑living not equivalent to required treatment | Court: reversal — Department did not assist in obtaining appropriate treatment or alternatives and thus failed reasonable‑efforts obligation; termination improper on that basis |
| Whether Department provided required mental‑health/step‑down services for A.A. | Father/CASA/GAL: A.A. needed day treatment and continued therapeutic supports to transition; Department failed to secure funding or set up services | Department: relied on school district funding decisions and limited resources | Court: flagged Department’s failures; remand required to evaluate whether lack of funding was proven and whether Department met reasonable‑efforts duties regarding A.A.’s needs |
Key Cases Cited
- People in Interest of C.A.K., 652 P.2d 603 (Colo. 1982) (longstanding deference standard for termination findings)
- K.D. v. People, 139 P.3d 695 (Colo. 2006) (trial‑court discretion on witness credibility and evidentiary weight in child‑protection cases)
- People in Interest of D.G., 140 P.3d 299 (Colo. App. 2006) (child health and safety are paramount in visitation/service determinations)
- Blaine v. Moffat Cty. Sch. Dist. Re No. 1, 748 P.2d 1280 (Colo. 1988) (distinguishing evidentiary facts from ultimate mixed questions of law and fact)
- People in Interest of N.F., 820 P.2d 1128 (Colo. App. 1991) (remand procedures when treatment plans require re‑evaluation before reconsidering termination)
- Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (U.S. 1982) (parents’ fundamental liberty interest in childrearing; heightened due‑process protections in termination proceedings)