Ims v. Town of Portsmouth, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 146

Ims, a former Portsmouth police officer, sued the town and two officials for malicious prosecution, tortious interference with contractual relations, whistleblower violation, and civil conspiracy arising from an internal police investigation of a training-exercise incident in 2001.
The state police conducted a separate inquiry, culminating in a grand jury that declined to indict Ims; the internal investigation then resumed, with a finding that Ims violated department use-of-force policy.
Ims was placed on administrative leave with pay, offered a LEOBOR process, and ultimately cleared to return to work in August 2002; he retired in 2004.
In December 2004, Ims gave the Town Council 11 pages of alleged wrongs in a notice of claim under § 45-15-5, and in January 2005 he filed suit against the town and the two officials.
Chief Seale and Lt. Vierra counterclaimed for defamation based on Ims’s notice letter; a trial court dismissed that defamation counterclaim as privileged under absolute privilege due to a judicial proceeding.
At trial (2009), the court granted JMOL in favor of defendants on malicious prosecution and tortious interference; a verdict was returned for defendants on the Whistleblower and civil conspiracy counts, while the defamation counterclaim remained under appeal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Malicious prosecution requires a criminal or civil proceeding with special injury	Ims argues there was a prior civil LEOBOR proceeding causing special injury.	Defendants contend no criminal proceeding and no recoverable special injury; LEOBOR is remedial, not a civil action.	Malicious prosecution claim fails; no criminal proceeding and no qualifying special injury.
Tortious interference requires a contract and improper interference	Ims alleges an implicit employment contract existed with the town via CBA-related rights and ongoing payments.	No separate contract existed; plaintiff only had a CBA, and interference was not improper.	No contract proven; no improper interference; judgment on this count affirmed.
Whether the § 45-15-5 notice communications are absolutely privileged	Notice letter to town council is part of a judicial process and protected by absolute privilege.	Town Council is not a judicial body and § 45-15-5 notices are not absolutely privileged.	Not absolutely privileged; may be quasi-privileged, but qualified privilege applies where malice is shown.
Whether the defamation counterclaim should have been reinstated and its privilege analyzed as qualified	Absolute privilege should immunize the notice statement under § 45-15-5.	Absolute privilege not applicable; qualified privilege may apply if malice absent, but malice must be proven.	Defendants’ counterclaim reinstated; qualified privilege applies, requiring proof of malice.

Ring v. Ring, 102 R.I. 112 (R.I. 1967) (special injury required for malicious prosecution based on civil action)
Soares v. Ann & Hope of Rhode Island, Inc., 637 A.2d 339 (R.I. 1994) (grand jury/prosecution distinctions; no criminal proceeding here)
Palazzo v. Alves, 944 A.2d 144 (R.I. 2008) (English Rule on special damages in malicious prosecution)
McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (U.S. 1985) (petition clause does not guarantee absolute immunity from libel)
Hillside Associates, 642 A.2d 664 (R.I. 1994) (broadly defines judicial/quasi-judicial proceedings for privilege)
Western Mass. Blasting Corp. v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 783 A.2d 398 (R.I. 2001) (quasi-judicial privilege in arbitrations)
In re Denisewich, 643 A.2d 1194 (R.I. 1994) (LEOBOR protections for officers under investigation)
In re Sabetta, 661 A.2d 80 (R.I. 1994) (LEOBOR context and officer rights)
Providence Lodge No. 3, Fraternal Order of Police v. Providence External Review Authority, 951 A.2d 497 (R.I. 2008) (LEOBOR-related rights and protections)