Imo Registrant A.D. Imo Registrant J.B. Imo Registrant C.m(076345) (Burlington County and Statewide), A-55-15

Three registrants (A.D., J.B., C.M.) convicted of sexual/offense-related crimes were subject to Megan’s Law registration requirements and later sought termination of those obligations after 15+ years.
Each registrant had an intervening conviction after their sex-offense conviction: A.D. (failure to notify parole officer, 2005), J.B. (failure to notify change of address, 2007), C.M. (violation of a final restraining order under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act).
Trial courts denied (or vacated a grant and denied on reconsideration) termination applications, treating the intervening convictions as bars under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f).
Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the Code’s general definitional provision—N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14(k)—defines “offense” in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f) to mean any crime, disorderly persons offense, or petty disorderly persons offense, not only a sex offense.
The Supreme Court granted certification and affirmed the Appellate Division substantially for the same reasons; the Court rejected the narrower construction that “offense” in 2C:7-2(f) means only a sex offense.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does “offense” in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f) mean any crime/disorderly persons offense (per N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14(k)) or only a “sex offense”?	Registrants: "offense" means only a sex offense for purposes of the 15-year bar; intervening non-sex convictions should not preclude termination.	State: "offense" adopts the Code definition—crime, disorderly persons, or petty disorderly persons offense—so intervening convictions of any such type bar termination.	The Court adopted the Code definition: "offense" includes crimes and disorderly persons offenses, not limited to sex offenses; affirmed App. Div. decision.
Whether trial courts must interpret the 15-year bar by reference to Megan’s Law’s purpose to limit scope to sex offenses.	Registrants: statutory purpose favors limiting "offense" to sex offenses to allow relief when no subsequent sex conduct occurred.	State: plain statutory text and the Code definition control; broader meaning is consistent with prior precedent.	The Court relied on statutory text and precedent (Doe v. Poritz) over purposive narrowing; rejected registrants’ broader purposive argument.

In the Matter of Registrant A.D., J.B., and C.M., 441 N.J. Super. 403 (App. Div. 2015) (Appellate Division opinion affirming denial of termination based on Code definition of “offense”)
Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1 (1995) (Supreme Court interpretation of Megan’s Law informing statutory construction)