Ildefonso-Candelario v. Attorney General of the United States, 866 F.3d 102

Roman Ildefonso-Candelario, a Mexican national, pled guilty (Oct 2015) to violating 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5101 (obstructing administration of law) and was later placed in removal proceedings for unlawful presence.
At his removal hearing he conceded removability but sought cancellation of removal; ICE argued his § 5101 conviction was a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT), making him statutorily ineligible for cancellation.
The Immigration Judge ruled § 5101 categorically a CIMT; the BIA (single member) adopted the IJ’s reasoning and affirmed.
The Third Circuit reviews de novo whether an offense is a CIMT; Chevron deference to the BIA was not applicable here because the decision was non‑precedential and single‑member.
The court examined § 5101’s text and Pennsylvania applications and concluded the statute covers non‑fraudulent, non‑depraved conduct (e.g., shouting at a meter maid; protestors chaining to block an intersection) that does not amount to moral turpitude.
The government sought a remand to the BIA for reconsideration; the Third Circuit denied the remand, held § 5101 is not categorically a CIMT, granted the petition, and remanded for further proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5101 is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude	§ 5101 is not a CIMT because it criminalizes non‑fraudulent, non‑depraved conduct (e.g., peaceful obstruction, insults, nonviolent physical interference)	§ 5101 is a CIMT because the statute punishes intentional obstruction of governmental functions and BIA precedent treated obstruction-by-deceit offenses as turpitudinous	Court held § 5101 is not categorically a CIMT: statute reaches conduct that lacks deceit/fraud or the requisite moral depravity
Whether the case should be remanded to the BIA for further consideration	Implicit: remand unnecessary because the statute plainly is not a CIMT and legal error is apparent	Government requested voluntary remand to allow the BIA to attempt a reasonable interpretation potentially entitled to Chevron deference	Court denied remand, finding no plausible interpretation of “moral turpitude” that could encompass § 5101’s least culpable conduct

Quao Lin Dong v. Attorney General, 638 F.3d 223 (3d Cir. 2011) (reviewing BIA and IJ decisions together)
Javier v. Attorney General, 826 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 2016) (de novo review of CIMT question)
Mehboob v. Attorney General, 549 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing Chevron deference to BIA)
Mahn v. Attorney General, 767 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2014) (limitations on deference for non‑precedential BIA decisions)
Partyka v. Attorney General, 417 F.3d 408 (3d Cir. 2005) (hallmarks of moral turpitude; deliberation requirement)
Jean‑Louis v. Attorney General, 582 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2009) (categorical approach and least‑culpable‑conduct analysis)
Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84 (3d Cir. 2004) (definition of moral turpitude)
Ren v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 2006) (discussing standards for agency remand requests)
Mayorga v. Attorney General, 757 F.3d 126 (3d Cir. 2014) (declining remand where legal error is apparent)
Flores‑Molina v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1150 (10th Cir. 2017) (survey of circuit authority on obstruction/perjury and moral turpitude)