Ibrahim v. City of Dayton, 2018 Ohio 1318

Background

On Aug. 20, 2014 Officer Walter Evans responded to a dispatch about a loud disturbance near the Reibold Building in downtown Dayton.
As Evans pulled up in a marked cruiser, a man he believed to be a security guard waved; Evans reversed a few feet at a few miles per hour to contact him and struck plaintiff Sanwr Ibrahim’s parked vehicle.
Damage to both vehicles was described as minor; Ibrahim did not testify but allegedly told Evans she was unharmed and preferred to leave.
Ibrahim sued the City of Dayton and Officer Evans for negligence and claimed severe personal injuries and other damages.
The City and Evans moved for summary judgment asserting immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744; the trial court granted summary judgment for defendants and Ibrahim appealed.
The appellate court reviewed de novo whether (1) Evans was responding to an “emergency call,” and (2) his conduct was willful, wanton, or reckless such that immunity would not apply.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was Evans "responding to an emergency call" when the collision occurred?	Ibrahim contends the disturbance had dissipated and Evans had resumed routine patrol before reversing, so he was not responding to an emergency call.	Evans (and City) relied on dispatch records, affidavit, and deposition showing he was arriving to investigate the disturbance and reversed to contact a person with information.	Court held Evans was responding to an emergency call; no genuine material fact dispute.
Does R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(a) immunity for municipal negligent vehicle operation apply?	Ibrahim argued an exception applies because Evans’s operation was willful, wanton, or reckless.	City argued the statute applies: officer was responding to an emergency call and his conduct was not willful or wanton.	Court held City entitled to immunity because evidence showed only minor, low-speed reverse movement and no willful or wanton conduct.
Is Officer Evans personally immune under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b)?	Ibrahim argued Evans acted wantonly or recklessly (failing to check mirrors/activate lights or siren).	Evans argued his conduct was not wanton or reckless given the very low speed, short distance reversed, and lack of evidence of conscious, unreasonable disregard.	Court held Evans entitled to employee immunity: conduct did not meet wanton or high-standard reckless threshold.
Was summary judgment appropriate?	Ibrahim requested remand for factual dispute resolution.	Defendants maintained no genuine issue of material fact; record supports immunity.	Court affirmed summary judgment for defendants.

Key Cases Cited

Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 375 N.E.2d 46 (summary judgment standard) (Ohio)
Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 662 N.E.2d 264 (nonmoving party must produce Civ.R. 56(C) evidence) (Ohio)
Colbert v. City of Cleveland, 99 Ohio St.3d 215, 790 N.E.2d 781 (definition and scope of "emergency call" under R.C. 2744.01(A)) (Ohio)
Anderson v. City of Massillon, 134 Ohio St.3d 380, 983 N.E.2d 266 (definitions and standards for willful, wanton, and reckless conduct) (Ohio)
Rankin v. Cuyahoga County Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 118 Ohio St.3d 392, 889 N.E.2d 521 (employee immunity standard under R.C. 2744.03) (Ohio)
Greene County Agric. Soc'y v. Liming, 89 Ohio St.3d 551, 733 N.E.2d 1141 (three-tiered R.C. 2744 analysis) (Ohio)
Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 82 Ohio St.3d 367, 696 N.E.2d 201 (summary judgment review principles) (Ohio)
Argabrite v. Neer, 149 Ohio St.3d 349, 75 N.E.3d 161 (application of recklessness standard) (Ohio)