Iannarelli v. Young, 2017 SD 71

Background

In 2007 Michael Iannarelli killed his wife and raped his 14‑year‑old stepdaughter; charged with first‑degree murder and second‑degree rape and faced potential death penalty.
Defense counsel Roger Ellyson obtained a psychiatric exam by Dr. Manlove; that report did not support legal insanity but supported a plea of guilty but mentally ill (GBMI).
Iannarelli pled GBMI to reduced charges in exchange for the State declining the death penalty; he submitted Dr. Manlove’s report to the court and the plea was accepted.
The sentencing court ordered a presentence psychological evaluation (including a psychosexual component) by Dr. Woldt; Iannarelli completed the exam after an informed‑consent form and Dr. Woldt’s report was included in the PSI.
The court relied on both experts’ reports and sentenced Iannarelli to lengthy terms. Postconviction, Iannarelli sought habeas relief arguing his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated because he was not warned of his right to remain silent before the Dr. Woldt exam and counsel was ineffective for not requesting provisional institutionalization under SDCL 23A‑27‑42.
The habeas court denied relief but issued a certificate of probable cause; the Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed on the merits.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether counsel was ineffective and Fifth Amendment violated because Iannarelli was not warned before Dr. Woldt’s exam	Ellyson should have warned Iannarelli of his right to remain silent; unwarned statements to Dr. Woldt were used at sentencing and prejudiced him	Iannarelli waived the Fifth Amendment by placing his mental state at issue via GBMI plea and by submitting psychiatric evidence; sentencing courts may consider broad evidence	Court held no Fifth Amendment violation and no ineffective assistance—Iannarelli waived the right and did not invoke silence
Whether a court‑ordered psychosexual/psychological exam is a critical stage requiring counsel to advise about silence	Counsel had duty to advise and possibly to be involved; failure to do so mirrors Idaho’s Estrada	Here counsel had explored mental defenses, used psychiatric evidence strategically, and Iannarelli knew the reports would be used	Court distinguished Estrada and held no Sixth Amendment violation because mental status was litigated and evidence was voluntarily put before the court
Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to seek provisional institutionalization under SDCL 23A‑27‑42	Counsel should have requested a hearing for provisional institutionalization because experts and judge acknowledged mental illness	Statute 23A‑27‑42 applies to defendants "found guilty," not to GBMI; SDCL 23A‑27‑38 governs GBMI and contemplates treatment via further examination while incarcerated	Court held SDCL 23A‑27‑42 did not apply to GBMI; no deficient performance or entitlement to relief
Whether the habeas court erred in issuing certificate of probable cause	Certificate should identify specific substantial showing per Lange	State: certificate was issued though form language was general	Court noted the habeas court failed to follow Lange guidelines but nonetheless addressed the appeal on the merits

Key Cases Cited

Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (recognizing Fifth Amendment protection for unwarned psychiatric statements used at sentencing)
Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 (defendant who presents psychiatric evidence may lose Fifth Amendment protection as to that subject)
State v. Berget, 826 N.W.2d 1 (S.D. 2013) (applied Estelle to bar use of competency report at sentencing where defendant did not place mental status at issue)
Estrada v. State, 149 P.3d 833 (Idaho 2006) (psychosexual evaluation is a critical stage; counsel must advise defendant about participation and silence)
Lange v. Weber, 602 N.W.2d 273 (S.D. 1999) (standards for certificates of probable cause in postconviction appeals)