Ian Walker v. Shermeta, Adams, Von Allmen, 623 F. App'x 764

Plaintiff received debt-collection letters from Shermeta, Adams & Von Allmen P.C. concerning alleged past-due student loans held by National Collegiate Student Loan Trusts (NCSLT).
Letters stated that “because of interest and other charges that may accrue, the amount you owe may continue to increase daily.”
Plaintiff alleged the letters were false, deceptive, and threatening under the FDCPA and Michigan’s analogous statute because Defendants could not lawfully add interest or charges.
The district court dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), concluding that saying charges "may" accrue was not false or a threat even if Defendants could not themselves add charges.
The Sixth Circuit reviewed de novo, applying the ‘‘least sophisticated consumer’’ standard and the materiality requirement for Section 1692e claims.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal but remanded to allow Plaintiff an opportunity to seek leave to amend because the complaint lacked factual allegations (e.g., the loan terms) necessary to show that additional charges could never accrue.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the statement that interest "may" accrue is false, deceptive, or threatening under the FDCPA	The letter misleads consumers into believing interest or fees will be added and is false if no such charges can lawfully accrue	The word "may" is truthful and indicates possibility, not a promise; thus not misleading	Saying charges "may" accrue is not per se false or threatening; dismissal affirmed unless plaintiff can plead that charges could never accrue
Standard for analyzing misleading debt-collection language	Evaluate from the least sophisticated consumer and materiality of the statement	Same standard; truth is not always a defense but literal accuracy matters	Apply least-sophisticated-consumer and materiality; a technically true statement can still mislead, but plaintiff must plausibly allege facts showing misleading effect
Effect of absence of loan documentation on Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal	Plaintiff alleged Defendants cannot add interest; that should be enough	Defendant argued dismissal appropriate because "may" is accurate regardless of practice	Without the loan or plausible allegations showing interest could never accrue, complaint is deficient; dismissal proper but with leave-to-amend opportunity
Applicability of analogous Michigan Collection Practices Act claim	Same theory as FDCPA claim; should proceed if FDCPA claim survives	Mirror FDCPA defense	Michigan claim rises or falls with FDCPA analysis; same pleading deficiency exists

F.H. ex rel. Hall v. Memphis City Sch., 764 F.3d 638 (6th Cir.) (standard of review for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal)
Currier v. First Resolution Inv. Corp., 762 F.3d 529 (6th Cir.) (FDCPA purpose and pleading plausibility under Iqbal/Twombly)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S.) (pleading standard for plausible claims)
Grden v. Leikin Ingber & Winters PC, 643 F.3d 169 (6th Cir.) (truth may still be misleading under least-sophisticated-consumer standard)
Taylor v. Calvary Investment, L.L.C., 365 F.3d 572 (7th Cir.) (collection-letter language stating charges "may" accrue held not misleading)
Miller v. Javitch, Block & Rathbone, 561 F.3d 588 (6th Cir.) (materiality requirement for §1692e claims)
Wallace v. Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A., 683 F.3d 323 (6th Cir.) (materiality means a statement would tend to mislead the reasonable unsophisticated consumer)
Bridge v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 681 F.3d 355 (6th Cir.) (broad scope of FDCPA and its remedial purpose)