Iaccino v. Anderson
940 N.E.2d 742
Ill. App. Ct.2010Background
- Parents sue for medical malpractice alleging Dr. Anderson caused fetal hypoxia via Pitocin-induced tachysystole and improper monitoring.
- Plaintiffs claim Dr. Anderson failed to discontinue Pitocin timely, caused fetal oxygen deprivation, and failed to recognize CPD and need for cesarean.
- Dr. Gibson and Womancare are additional defendants; hospital Northwest Community Hospital is a related defendant.
- Defendants contend placental infection independently caused Jonathon's brain injury, not malpractice.
- Jury returned a general verdict in favor of defendants; plaintiffs appeal seeking a new trial.
- Key pretrial issues involve admissibility of a 2-622 medical report for impeachment and whether certain causation opinions and literature references were properly disclosed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| May a written 2-622 report be used to impeach a treating expert? | Iaccino contends cross-exam using the 2-622 report is improper. | Anderson et al. argue the report may impeach consistent with rule policy. | Yes; the report may be used as a prior inconsistent statement for impeachment. |
| Did Dr. Franciosi's Rule 213 disclosures and deposition support causation testimony at trial? | Franciosi's Rule 213 disclosure/deposition did not state placental pathologies caused brain injury. | Disclosures and deposition testified to a causal link via placental pathologies. | Court upheld admission; disclosures supported causation testimony. |
| Was it improper to use medical literature to cross-examine and argue causation without strict disclosure under Rule 213? | Literature references were undisclosed and improper under Rule 213. | Literature was disclosed or reasonably deducible; cross-examination proper. | Not improper; cross-examination and closing references to literature were allowed. |
| Did the trial court abuse its discretion by excluding or restricting nurse testimony on fetal monitoring and decision-making? | Nurses should testify about monitoring and urgency of delivery. | Nurse testimony on ultimate clinical decisions and interpretation of strips was outside nursing expertise. | Court did not err; nurse Hibbs' testimony on interpretation was barred from opinions about delivering earlier; allowed for explanation only. |
Key Cases Cited
- Moyer v. Southern Illinois Hospital Service Corp., 327 Ill. App. 3d 889 (2002) (affirms use of expert opinions and 2-622 framework in malpractice context)
- Thompson v. Abbott Laboratories, 193 Ill. App. 3d 188 (1990) (foundation requirement for prior inconsistent statements)
- Central Steel & Wire Co. v. Coating Research Corp., 53 Ill. App. 3d 943 (1977) (foundation for impeachment of a witness via prior statements)
- Boyce v. Risch, 276 Ill. App. 3d 274 (1995) (identification of prior statement for impeachment foundation)
- Vancil v. Fletcher, 90 Ill. App. 2d 277 (1967) (basis for laying foundation of prior inconsistent statements)
- Sommese v. Mailing Brothers, Inc., 36 Ill. 2d 263 (1966) (prior inconsistent statements as credibility test)
- Sears v. Rutishauser, 102 Ill. 2d 402 (1984) (cross-examination as safeguard for expert testimony)
- Leonardi v. Loyola University of Chicago, 168 Ill. 2d 83 (1996) (policy basis for strict cross-examination of experts)
- Piano v. Davison, 157 Ill. App. 3d 649 (1987) (experts may be cross-examined about materials they reviewed but did not rely upon)
- Gees v. Brichta, 248 Ill. App. 3d 398 (1993) (admissibility of expert testimony based on hypothesized injuries)