Hyundai Motor Co. v. Duncan, 766 S.E.2d 893

Gage sustained a serious closed-head injury in a 2008 Tiburon crash; the side airbag did not deploy.
Duncans pursued a claim of implied warranty of merchantability against Hyundai, alleging the Tiburon was defective and unreasonably dangerous.
Duncans designated Geoffrey Mahon, a mechanical engineer, as an expert to opine that the side airbag would have deployed if the sensor had been located on the B-pillar rather than the cross-member.
Hyundai moved in limine to exclude Mahon’s opinions for lack of foundation because Mahon did no testing or calculations to support deployment at the proposed location.
Circuit Court admitted Mahon’s testimony; trial proceeded and the jury later verdict favored the Duncans.
On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court reversed, holding Mahon’s opinion lacked sufficient evidentiary foundation and that exclusion was required, effectively resolving the merchantability claim in Hyundai’s favor.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Mahon’s airbag-location opinion had a sufficient factual foundation	Duncans contend Mahon relied on data and industry experience to claim deployment would occur at the proposed location.	Hyundai argues Mahon did not perform tests or calculations and relied on speculative assumptions.	Yes; opinion lacks sufficient foundation and was inadmissible.
Whether the trial court properly admitted Mahon’s B-pillar deployment theory	Duncans rely on location study data to support deployment if sensor was at B-pillar.	Hyundai urges dependence on tested locations and cautions against untested extrapolation.	Admissibility improper; probative value outweighed by lack of testing.
Whether the trial court’s failure to strike unfounded testimony warrants reversal	Mahon’s X-location testimony is admissible as rebutting the cross-examined Proposed Location.	The court should strike ungrounded assertions that lack factual basis.	Abuse of discretion; requires reversal on the expert foundation issue.
Whether FMVSS compliance evidence is dispositive in merchantability analysis	FMVSS compliance bears on reasonable safety and care in design.	FMVSS compliance is a floor, not a dispositive standard for merchantability.	Evidence of FMVSS consideration is relevant but not dispositive; not outcome-determinative in this case.

Vasquez v. Mabini, 269 Va. 155 (2005) (expert testimony must have evidentiary support and consider all variables)
CNH America LLC v. Smith, 281 Va. 60 (2011) (experts must base opinions on a sufficient factual basis)
General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) (analytical gap between data and opinion invalid when ipse dixit)
Forbes v. Rapp, 269 Va. 374 (2005) (adequate factual foundation required for expert testimony)
John Crane, Inc. v. Jones, 274 Va. 581 (2007) (abuse of discretion standard for evidentiary rulings; trial court’s discretion limited)
Harman v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 288 Va. 84 (2014) (clear prohibition on admitting clearly inadmissible evidence)
Smith v. Kim, 277 Va. 486 (2009) (jury instructions and law-clarity in evaluating theories of the case)