midpage
Projects
Sign in to see your projects.
306 F. Supp. 3d 756
W.D. Pa.
2018
Read the full case

Background

  • In 2014 Plaintiff bought a Toyota Corolla financed by Capital One, which held a security interest; in 2016 Capital One (through Commonwealth Recovery’s agent, the “repo man”) repossessed the vehicle from Plaintiff’s driveway without a court order.
  • Plaintiff and a passenger (Shyree) objected; Plaintiff repeatedly told the repo agent to leave private property and the passenger initially remained in the car.
  • The repo agent summoned Pennsylvania State Police troopers (including Defs. Devlin and Morris); troopers allegedly assisted, threatened to break the window, order the passenger out, and directed Plaintiff to surrender the vehicle.
  • Plaintiff amended her complaint asserting FDCPA and UCC claims (Counts I–II), conversion/trespass to chattels (Count III) and trespass (Count IV) against Capital One and Commonwealth Recovery, and § 1983 claims against state actors in official (Count V) and individual capacities (Count VI).
  • Capital One and Commonwealth Recovery moved to dismiss Counts III–IV and punitive damages; Commonwealth Defendants moved to dismiss Counts V–VI.
  • Court denied dismissal of Counts III–IV and punitive damages; denied dismissal of § 1983 individual-capacity claims against Troopers Devlin and Morris; dismissed § 1983 official-capacity claim against Col. Blocker for lack of standing and dismissed several defendants accordingly.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Conversion / trespass to chattels (Count III) against Capital One & Commonwealth Recovery Repo man deprived Plaintiff of possessory rights; assistance by police converted repossession into wrongful taking Plaintiff lacks ownership/possession; Capital One’s security interest precludes conversion; repo man acted at police direction Denied motion to dismiss: complaint plausibly alleges possession, deprivation, and breach of the peace that nullified repo privilege under § 9609, so conversion/trespass to chattels survive
Trespass (Count IV) against Capital One & Commonwealth Recovery Repo agent remained on private property after being told to leave and enlisted police, exceeding any limited privilege to enter Repo entry was lawful under § 9609 and occurred on driveway (less protected area); absence of no-trespass signage undermines claim Denied motion to dismiss: allegations that agent stayed after being told to leave and that police assistance breached the peace plausibly state trespass
Punitive damages for Counts III–IV Alleged intentional, willful, reckless conduct in repossession and trespass supports punitive damages Only ordinary torts alleged; no facts showing willful, wanton, or malicious state of mind; actions were at police direction Denied motion to dismiss punitive damages: facts could support inference of reckless/willful conduct, question for factfinder
§ 1983 (individual capacity) against Troopers Devlin & Morris (Count VI) — Fourth/Fourteenth Amendment Troopers affirmatively assisted repossession, threatened force, and directed surrender — seizure and denial of procedural due process Troopers merely kept the peace and did not actively assist; no state action for constitutional liability Denied motion to dismiss: allegations show affirmative assistance (facilitation, threats, direction) — state action and unreasonable seizure/procedural due process plausibly alleged; qualified immunity unavailable because law was clearly established
§ 1983 (official capacity) against Col. Blocker — prospective injunctive relief (Count V) Seeks injunctive relief to require PSP policies forbidding assistance in civil repossessions without court order No standing to seek prospective relief; any future injury speculative Granted dismissal with prejudice: Plaintiff lacks standing to obtain prospective injunctive relief (no real/immediate threat); amendment would be futile

Key Cases Cited

  • Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (pleading must state a plausible claim)
  • Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (framework for plausibility review of complaints)
  • Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56 (U.S. 1992) (seizure occurs when there is meaningful interference with possessory interests)
  • Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 635 F.3d 606 (3d Cir. 2011) (police cross line into state action when they move from neutrality to affirmative aid in private repossession)
  • West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (U.S. 1988) (§ 1983 requires state action and deprivation of constitutional right)
  • Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (U.S. 2009) (qualified immunity two-pronged inquiry)
Read the full case

Case Details

Case Name: Hyman v. Capital One Auto Fin.
Court Name: District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
Date Published: Jan 23, 2018
Citations: 306 F. Supp. 3d 756; CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17–89
Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17–89
Court Abbreviation: W.D. Pa.
Log In
    Hyman v. Capital One Auto Fin., 306 F. Supp. 3d 756