Hyman v. Brown
197 F. Supp. 3d 413
E.D.N.Y2016Background
- In March 2000 a multi‑participant shootout outside 1540 Hassock St., Far Rockaway, killed bystander Maria Medina; ballistics linked several casings and two guns to shots fired in the street but not to petitioner Tullie Hyman.
- At trial the sole eyewitness who directly implicated Hyman was Shaquana Ellis, who testified she saw Hyman firing from a green Mazda; other eyewitnesses did not identify Hyman as the shooter. Hyman did not testify and maintained he was the ambushed driver of a car.
- Defense investigator Kevin Hinkson conducted a pretrial sight‑line study and interviewed a statutory witness (Amanda Benitez) that, according to Hinkson, made it impossible for Ellis to have seen what she described; trial counsel did not call Hinkson at trial, later attributing the omission to a fee dispute with Hinkson.
- After conviction, Ellis repeatedly recanted over many years; Hyman raised new‑evidence and ineffective‑assistance claims in state post‑conviction (CPL 440), which the state court denied without a hearing; federal habeas followed.
- The district court held an evidence hearing on the Schlup actual‑innocence gateway and, having found Ellis’s core recant credible (corroborated by Benitez, Delain, and Hinkson), concluded that "more likely than not" a reasonable juror would have reasonable doubt and therefore reached and granted Hyman’s ineffective‑assistance claim under Strickland/AEDPA, ordering conditional release unless retried.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Actual‑innocence gateway (Schlup) | Ellis’s recant + corroboration (Benitez, Delain, Hinkson) is new, reliable evidence that would likely create reasonable doubt | State relied on the trial record and sought to introduce additional pretrial witness statements as rebuttal; argued remaining evidence suffices | Court found Ellis’s core recant credible and that, viewed with all old and new evidence, petitioner met Schlup: more likely than not reasonable jurors would have doubt (gateway opened) |
| Ineffective assistance for failing to present Hinkson’s exculpatory sight‑line evidence | Trial counsel omitted key impeachment/evidentiary material due to a fee dispute with investigator, not strategy; omission was deficient and prejudicial because Ellis was the linchpin of the case | State maintains remaining evidence supports conviction and trial choices were tactical; state court rejected claim as unpreserved/meritless | Court held state court unreasonably applied Strickland/AEDPA: counsel’s failure (tainted by conflict over fees) was deficient and prejudiced petitioner; habeas relief granted unless retried |
| State procedural bar (failure to raise claim on direct appeal / CPL 440 rulings) | Hyman invoked Schlup actual‑innocence gateway to overcome procedural default | State relied on state courts’ procedural rulings denying CPL 440 relief and preserving default | Court found gateway satisfied so federal review was allowed; state court’s denial on the merits was an unreasonable application of Strickland under §2254(d) |
| Use of "old" rebuttal evidence at innocence hearing | Petitioner: habeas review should focus on whether new evidence undermines confidence; not allow state to flood in inadmissible/old inculpatory proof to negate recant | State: House/Schlup allow consideration of "all the evidence old and new," so rebuttal evidence may be considered | Court expressed reservations about admitting inadmissible/previously withheld inculpatory materials but concluded it need not resolve the open question — petitioner prevails even if rebuttal evidence considered |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two‑prong ineffective assistance standard and conflict‑of‑interest principles)
- Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (procedural‑gateway actual‑innocence standard; new reliable evidence may excuse procedural default)
- House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (actual‑innocence inquiry requires reviewing "all the evidence, old and new" and assessing likely impact on reasonable jurors)
- McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (actual innocence can serve as gateway to overcome statute‑of‑limitations or procedural bars)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (limits §2254(d) review to the state‑court record for merits adjudication)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (AEDPA deference and the high bar to show state court unreasonableness under Strickland)
- Rivas v. Fischer, 687 F.3d 514 (2d Cir.) (discussion of the ‘‘credible’ and ‘compelling’ Schlup prongs and how new evidence must undermine the verdict)
- Pavel v. Hollins, 261 F.3d 210 (2d Cir.) (example of relief and conditional release where counsel failed to present exculpatory evidence)