Hutterville Hutterian Brethren v. Jeffrey Sveen
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 523
| 8th Cir. | 2015Background
- Hutterville Hutterian Brethren, Inc. is a South Dakota nonprofit corporation whose membership and corporate governance track an internal religious split in the Schmiedeleut conference of the Hutterite faith (Group 1 led by Kleinsasser/Waldner and Group 2 led by Wipf).
- In 2008–2009 rival faction members held competing corporate meetings; Wipf faction claimed to have elected new directors/officers and conducted business in Hutterville’s name; Waldner faction claimed those corporate acts were sham and that Wipf members had been ecclesiastically excommunicated and thus ineligible to hold corporate office.
- South Dakota state courts twice concluded they lacked constitutional jurisdiction to resolve which faction controlled Hutterville because doing so would require resolving ecclesiastical questions (Hutterville I and Hutterville II), and a receivership and related rulings were litigated and affirmed on other grounds (Hutterville III).
- The Waldners then sued in federal court (RICO and state-law claims) against attorneys and a receiver, alleging those defendants conspired with the Wipf faction to manufacture the dispute, convert corporate assets, and facilitate a takeover.
- The district court dismissed: official-capacity (corporate) claims without prejudice because resolving who could sue in the corporate name would require impermissible inquiry into religious matters; individual-capacity claims with prejudice for lack of individual property rights and on immunity grounds for the receiver.
- The Eighth Circuit affirmed: plaintiffs have Article III standing at the pleading stage if their factual allegations are assumed true, but their claims necessarily require resolving which faction properly controls Hutterville — an inquiry barred by the First Amendment and precluded by the plaintiffs’ prior positions (judicial estoppel).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Article III standing for claims brought in Hutterville’s name | Waldners plead concrete corporate injuries (conversion of property, diverted funds) and thus have standing if allegations are assumed true | Defendants: establishing injury-in-fact requires knowing which faction controls Hutterville; that requires resolving religious questions | Court: At pleading stage, assuming allegations true, Waldners adequately pled Article III standing; standing not conflated with merits |
| Capacity to sue in corporate name / corporate governance | Waldners claim they are Hutterville’s rightful officers and can sue in corporation’s name | Defendants: whether Waldners may sue depends on which faction are the lawful directors — a question entangled with ecclesiastical membership and leadership | Court: Capacity to sue depends on state law and on who controls the corporation; the governance question is central to the merits and capacity |
| First Amendment entanglement (judicial inquiry into ecclesiastical matters) | Waldners: there is no live religious dispute because church hierarchy has already determined Wipf is not a member; or the religious dispute is a sham/fraud that they should be allowed to expose | Defendants: any inquiry into who controls Hutterville would require resolving church membership, excommunications, and ecclesiastical leadership — barred by First Amendment | Court: Resolving control would require forbidden resolution of ecclesiastical questions; therefore the court may not decide the governance question here |
| Judicial estoppel based on state-court positions | Waldners argue they should be allowed discovery/evidentiary hearing to prove the religious dispute is sham and that they are rightful officers | Defendants point to plaintiffs’ prior successful positions in state court arguing secular courts lack jurisdiction to decide governance | Held: Judicial estoppel bars Waldners from taking a contrary position now because they successfully persuaded state courts earlier that these questions are non-justiciable; plaintiffs cannot now seek relief that would require overturning that prior position |
Key Cases Cited
- Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (secular courts may resolve property disputes using neutral principles but must avoid resolving doctrinal/ecclesiastical questions)
- Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (courts must defer to highest ecclesiastical tribunals on internal church governance decisions)
- Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (civil courts cannot resolve certain disputes over church control when doctrinal or hierarchical questions are involved)
- Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (establishes prohibition on civil courts deciding ecclesiastical controversies)
- Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (RICO predicate-act requirement and standing to sue under RICO)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (standing requires concrete, particularized injury fairly traceable and redressable)
- Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (standing inquiry must not be conflated with the merits)
- Moore v. Matthew’s Book Co., 597 F.2d 645 (capacity to sue is governed by state law; multiple trustees example)
- New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (judicial estoppel prevents parties from taking inconsistent positions in successive proceedings)
- Church of God in Christ, Inc. v. Graham, 54 F.3d 522 (8th Cir.) (application of neutral-principles approach to church property/governance disputes)
