Hutchison v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office
2017 COA 79
| Colo. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Claimant Richard Hutchison, a long‑time trailer mechanic, developed bilateral knee osteoarthritis and sought workers’ compensation for an occupational disease from repetitive kneeling/crawling at work.
- Treating and independent physicians agreed claimant had severe osteoarthritis and independent risk factors (obesity, family history, idiopathic OA).
- Employer’s IME (Dr. Bernton) concluded work aggravated but did not cause the OA; he apportioned ~1/3 to work and ~2/3 to nonwork factors.
- Claimant’s retained physician (Dr. Hughes) agreed independent factors contributed and could not state within a reasonable degree of medical probability that work alone caused the condition, but believed work substantially contributed to need for knee replacement.
- ALJ credited Dr. Bernton, apportioned 33.33% of medical benefits to employer, and the Industrial Claim Appeals Office affirmed. Claimant appealed, arguing statutory prohibition on apportionment and misapplication of Anderson.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 8‑42‑104(3) prohibits apportionment for a multi‑factor occupational disease | Hutchison: statute bars reduction of medical benefits based on a “previous injury,” so apportionment is prohibited here | Employer/Panel: claimant’s OA is one ongoing disease with multiple causes, not a separate prior injury, so § 8‑42‑104(3) does not apply | Court: “previous injury” means a distinct earlier injury; statute does not bar apportionment of a single, multifactor occupational disease |
| Whether Anderson apportionment is inapplicable because claimant’s condition was not independently disabling pre‑aggravation | Hutchison: Anderson is distinguishable; apportionment only where disease manifested before work exposure | Employer/Panel: Anderson (and Masdin) permit apportionment when workplace exposure contributes to a multifactor disease; timing of symptoms is not dispositive | Court: Anderson applies; timing distinction irrelevant; apportionment to nonwork factors (including predisposition/aging) is permissible |
| Whether apportionment to genetic predisposition/other nonwork factors is barred | Hutchison: apportioning to genetic predisposition or natural proclivities improperly shifts burden to employee | Employer/Panel: evidence showed independent risk factors contributing; apportionment is supported by medical testimony | Court: Apportionment to preexisting conditions or risk factors is permissible where supported by substantial evidence (but concurrence warns against apportionment solely to unmanifested genetic predisposition) |
| Whether substantial evidence supports 1/3 apportionment to work | Hutchison: ALJ’s 1/3 apportionment was speculative | Employer/Panel: Dr. Bernton’s explicit one‑third opinion and Dr. Hughes’ corroboration provide concrete support | Court: Substantial evidence supports ALJ’s credibility findings and 1/3 apportionment; not speculative |
Key Cases Cited
- Masdin v. Gardner‑Denver‑Cooper Indus., Inc., 689 P.2d 714 (Colo.App. 1984) (apportionment allowed where occupational conditions act on preexisting weakness to produce disability)
- Anderson v. Brinkhoff, 859 P.2d 819 (Colo. 1993) (supreme court adopted Masdin apportionment principles for occupational disease)
- Duncan v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 107 P.3d 999 (Colo.App. 2004) (upheld apportionment to aging/degenerative factors despite asymptomatic history)
- Paint Connection Plus v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 240 P.3d 429 (Colo.App. 2010) (deference to ALJ fact‑finding and substantial evidence standard)
- Parrish v. Indus. Comm’n, 379 P.2d 384 (Colo. 1963) (apportionment rejected where physicians could not quantify percentage; speculative opinions insufficient)