Hutcherson v. Rutledge
2017 Ark. 359
| Ark. | 2017Background
- Willie Hutcherson was convicted in 2000 of multiple robbery and theft offenses and sentenced as a habitual offender; convictions affirmed on direct appeal.
- Hutcherson sued pro se in 2016 under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act (ACRA) and for civil conspiracy and outrage, alleging misconduct by his original public defender (Abed) and the prosecutor (Bell) during pretrial and trial events in 1999.
- Allegations included that two investigative statements naming others were disclosed in discovery, that Abed obtained and later handed the statements to the prosecutor, and that Bell influenced subsequent defense counsel to waive issues on appeal.
- Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing among other defenses that the claims were time-barred by the statute of limitations; the circuit court dismissed the complaint without prejudice on those grounds.
- The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed a motion-to-dismiss de novo, treating pleaded facts as true and concluding the complaint facially showed the claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ACRA and tort claims are time‑barred | Hutcherson alleged misconduct in 1999 and filed in 2016 but argued wrongs tolled limitations | Defendants argued three‑year limitations applies and claims expired | Held: Claims barred; three‑year statute applies and untimely on face of complaint |
| Whether fraudulent concealment tolled limitations | Hutcherson implied defendants concealed causes of action by covering up misconduct | Defendants argued no specific non‑conclusory allegations of affirmative fraudulent concealment | Held: Plaintiff failed to plead specific fraudulent acts to toll limitations |
| Applicable statute of limitations period | Hutcherson contended claims were viable despite delay (implicitly) | Defendants asserted three‑year limitations governs statutory civil‑rights and tort claims | Held: Three‑year limitations applies (Ark. Code §16‑56‑105(3) and §1983 analogies) |
| Whether dismissal could rest on other immunity/defense grounds | Hutcherson challenged merits of defenses (not detailed) | Defendants listed res judicata, sovereign/qualified/absolute immunity, failure to state claims, and collateral‑attack bar | Held: Court affirmed dismissal based on statute of limitations and did not reach other defenses |
Key Cases Cited
- Biedenharn v. Thicksten, 361 Ark. 438 (2005) (motion‑to‑dismiss review treats pleaded facts as true and views them favorably to plaintiff)
- Dunlap v. McCarty, 284 Ark. 5 (1984) (limitations defense on motion to dismiss requires claim to be barred on its face)
- Chalmers v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., 326 Ark. 895 (1997) (burden on plaintiff to prove tolling by preponderance once defendant raises limitations)
- First Pyramid Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Stoltz, 311 Ark. 313 (1992) (ignorance of right does not toll limitations absent affirmative fraudulent concealment)
- O'Mara v. Dykema, 328 Ark. 310 (1997) (three‑year limitations applies to tort actions not otherwise limited)
- McQuay v. Guntharp, 331 Ark. 466 (1998) (tort of outrage governed by three‑year limitations)
- Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985) (state personal‑injury limitations applied to §1983 actions)
