Hustrulid v. Stakebake
516 P.3d 18
Ariz. Ct. App.2022Background
- Christopher Hustrulid is the biological father of two children whose parental rights were terminated; his sister, Nicole Stakebake, adopted the children in March 2019.
- After limited post-release contact, Hustrulid filed a third-party petition under A.R.S. § 25-409 seeking joint legal decision-making and placement (and alternatively third-party visitation) after Stakebake cut off contact.
- The superior court dismissed the third-party visitation claim and initially denied a Rule 12(b)(6)-style dismissal of the joint legal decision-making/placement claim, but later reconsidered and summarily dismissed the petition without prejudice for failing to establish the § 25-409(A)(2) "significant detriment" element.
- Hustrulid appealed; the court of appeals found the dismissal without prejudice non-appealable but accepted the matter as a special action to resolve legal questions and clarify § 25-409 standards.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal, held a nonparent cannot be awarded joint legal decision‑making with a legal parent, and clarified the pleading and proof framework for § 25-409 petitions (initial pleading must sufficiently allege the statutory elements; if not summarily denied, a hearing is required where the petitioner must prove the elements and rebut the presumption in § 25-409(B)).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jurisdiction: Is dismissal without prejudice appealable? | Hustrulid proceeded with appeal. | Stakebake argued dismissal without prejudice is not final or appealable. | Dismissal without prejudice is not appealable; court exercised special-action jurisdiction. |
| Can a former parent (parental rights terminated) seek third-party rights under § 25-409? | Hustrulid: § 25-409 does not expressly preclude former parents from filing. | Stakebake: Adoption/termination severs legal relationship and bars such claims. | Statute does not explicitly bar former parents; they may petition as a "person other than a legal parent." |
| May a court award joint legal decision-making to a nonparent alongside a legal parent? | Hustrulid: joint legal decision-making can be awarded to allow ongoing involvement. | Stakebake: joint award to nonparent is inconsistent with statute and precedent. | As a matter of law, a court cannot award joint legal decision‑making to a nonparent; petition properly dismissed. |
| Pleading/proof standard under § 25-409(A) and Chapman: Is Rule 12(b)(6) the standard and can "significant detriment" be relitigated at hearing? | Hustrulid: Chapman applies and initial pleading standard governs; evidence may be presented at hearing. | Stakebake: court may summarily dismiss if elements not established; questioned Chapman language about limiting review. | Initial pleading must allege facts that if true would establish each § 25-409(A) element to avoid summary denial; if not summarily denied, an evidentiary hearing is required to prove elements and to rebut § 25-409(B) by clear and convincing evidence; Chapman should not be read to preclude full hearing of elements. |
Key Cases Cited
- Chapman v. Hopkins, 243 Ariz. 236 (App. 2017) (describes pleading threshold and subsequent evidentiary hearing framework for § 25-409 petitions)
- Thomas v. Thomas, 203 Ariz. 34 (App. 2002) (holds courts cannot award joint custody/legal decision-making to a legal parent and a nonparent)
- Downs v. Scheffler, 206 Ariz. 496 (App. 2003) (overlap between significant-detriment and best-interest analyses in third-party proceedings)
- DePasquale v. Superior Ct., 181 Ariz. 333 (App. 1995) (describes pleading screening under statutes requiring "adequate cause" before full hearing)
- In re Marriage of Friedman, 244 Ariz. 111 (App. 2018) (appellate courts may affirm for correct result even if lower court relied on different reasoning)