Husic v. Commissioner of Social Security
5:18-cv-01120
N.D.N.Y.Jan 2, 2020Background
- Plaintiff filed for Disability Insurance Benefits alleging physical (back, shoulder, knee, arthritis) and mental (depression, PTSD/anxiety) impairments with an alleged onset of September 26, 2014.
- ALJ held a hearing on April 11, 2017, and issued a decision on May 30, 2017 denying benefits; Appeals Council declined review.
- ALJ found severe impairments: left shoulder rotator cuff tendinosis/partial supraspinatus tear, lumbosacral disc disease with herniation, fibromyalgia, inflammatory arthritis, and connective tissue disorder; mental impairments were deemed non-severe.
- RFC: plaintiff can perform light work with limits — occasional stairs/balance/stoop/kneel/crouch/crawl, no ladders, no hazardous environments, frequent (not constant) handling/fingering/reaching, and no overhead reaching/lifting.
- ALJ found plaintiff could not do her past work but could perform jobs (small parts assembler; inspector/hand packager) identified by the vocational expert; claimant appealed, challenging the ALJ’s treatment of medical opinions and the RFC.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ALJ erred at step two by finding mental impairments non-severe | Plaintiff: ALJ ignored or minimized diagnoses (depression/PTSD/anxiety) and failed to include mental limits in RFC | Commissioner: ALJ reasonably evaluated evidence; claimant failed to show work-related functional limits; any step-two error was harmless because mental issues were considered later | Court: Mental impairments properly found non-severe; ALJ’s discussion addressed the record and any error was harmless |
| Whether ALJ improperly discounted treating physician Debra Buchan, M.D. | Plaintiff: ALJ substituted lay judgment for Dr. Buchan and failed to apply regulatory factors; Buchan’s long treatment relationship supports significant weight | Commissioner: ALJ permissibly compared Buchan’s conclusions to objective findings and other consultative evidence; substantial evidence supported giving little weight | Court: ALJ did not err; he considered record consistency and support and permissibly weighed Buchan’s opinion |
| Whether ALJ improperly rejected mental source statement by NP Stark co-signed by Dr. Tohtz | Plaintiff: Dr. Tohtz’s signature makes it a treating physician opinion entitled to controlling weight | Commissioner: Even if treated as physician‑signed, ALJ reasonably discounted it due to lack of treatment/exam by Dr. Tohtz and inconsistency with consultative exam | Court: ALJ properly evaluated the jointly‑signed statement, relied on consultative psychiatric exam, and permissibly assigned little weight |
| Whether RFC is unsupported because ALJ relied on consultative exam over treating opinions | Plaintiff: RFC fails to capture true limitations; ALJ improperly favored consultative findings | Commissioner: ALJ can resolve conflicts and craft RFC from all evidence; consultative exams can be substantial evidence | Court: RFC is supported by substantial evidence; ALJ lawfully reconciled conflicting opinions and relied on record evidence including consultative exams |
Key Cases Cited
- Poupore v. Astrue, 566 F.3d 303 (2d Cir. 2009) (courts review whether ALJ applied correct legal standards and whether decision is supported by substantial evidence)
- Tejada v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 770 (2d Cir. 1999) (first step of review is whether correct legal standard was applied)
- Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1982) (when evidence permits more than one rational interpretation, ALJ's choice must stand)
- Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1988) (reviewing court must consider whole record, including evidence that detracts from ALJ's finding)
- Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1996) (burden of proof at steps one-four on claimant; shifts to Commissioner at step five)
- Bapp v. Bowen, 802 F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1986) (existence of non-exertional impairment does not automatically require a vocational expert)
- Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 683 F.3d 443 (2d Cir. 2012) (factfinder's credibility and factual findings are entitled to deference; remand only if reasonable factfinder could not reach same conclusion)
- Petrie v. Astrue, [citation="412 F. App'x 401"] (2d Cir. 2011) (ALJ need not mechanically recite every treating‑source factor so long as substance is evident)
- Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (U.S. 1938) (definition of substantial evidence)