Hurst v. Moore
2017 Ohio 7238
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2017Background
- In 2008 Mark Hurst was convicted of offenses involving minors and was originally classified as a sexual offender and required to register under Ohio’s SORN; that classification was vacated on appeal in 2012.
- Despite the vacatur, in August 2015 Detective Wayne Moore contacted Hurst and entered Hurst’s information into the National Sex Offender Registry after being asked to investigate by an APA officer.
- Hurst sued Moore for defamation, alleging publication of false information (that he was a "registered sex offender").
- The trial court granted summary judgment to Moore, concluding Hurst failed to show special harm (no defamation per quod) and that the registry listing did not injure Hurst beyond consequences of his convictions (no defamation per se). The court did not find Moore immune under R.C. 2744.
- On appeal, the court considered whether Hurst’s claim could be defamation per se given the vacated classification and whether Moore was entitled to statutory immunity under R.C. 2744.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether publication to the sex-offender registry was false and actionable defamation | Hurst: listing as a "registered sex offender" was false because his classification was vacated and thus this publication could subject him to contempt/ridicule | Moore: publication tracked SORN/AG records and was not defamatory beyond existing convictions; Hurst showed no special damages | There is a genuine issue whether the registry listing was defamatory per se because Hurst’s classification had been vacated (reversed as to liability) |
| Whether Hurst pleaded/proved special damages for defamation per quod | Hurst: did not allege special damages | Moore: no special damages shown | Trial court correct that no special damages were shown; defamation per quod fails |
| Whether Moore is statutorily immune under R.C. 2744 for actions within scope of employment | Hurst: Moore acted maliciously/wanton/bad faith by causing registration despite vacatur | Moore: acted within scope, investigated via AG/SORN records and APA referral; no evidence of malice or wantonness | Moore is entitled to immunity under R.C. 2744 because no material dispute of malice/bad faith/wantonness exists (appellate court sustained immunity) |
| Whether trial judge showed bias toward pro se plaintiff | Hurst: trial court biased against pro se litigant | Moore: not raised as a defense to merits | Appellate court lacks jurisdiction over judicial bias claims under R.C. 2701.03; assignment overruled |
Key Cases Cited
- Hounshell v. Am. States Ins. Co., 67 Ohio St.2d 427, 424 N.E.2d 311 (Ohio 1981) (summary judgment standard and when material facts preclude judgment)
- Inland Refuse Transfer Co. v. Browning-Ferris Inds. of Ohio, Inc., 15 Ohio St.3d 321, 474 N.E.2d 271 (Ohio 1984) (court may not resolve evidentiary ambiguities on summary judgment)
- Smiddy v. The Wedding Party, Inc., 30 Ohio St.3d 35, 506 N.E.2d 212 (Ohio 1987) (appellate review of summary judgment is de novo)
- Doe v. Shaffer, 90 Ohio St.3d 388, 738 N.E.2d 1243 (Ohio 2000) (standards for appellate review)
- A & B-Abell Elevator Co. v. Columbus/Cent. Ohio Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 73 Ohio St.3d 1, 651 N.E.2d 1283 (Ohio 1995) (definition and scope of defamation per se)
- Anderson v. Massillon, 134 Ohio St.3d 380, 983 N.E.2d 266 (Ohio 2012) (definitions of wanton misconduct and reckless conduct)
- Beer v. Griffith, 54 Ohio St.2d 440, 377 N.E.2d 775 (Ohio 1978) (disqualification proceedings and appellate jurisdiction limitations)