Hurst v. Department of Police, 146 So. 3d 857

Officer Hurst attended a fraternity party in uniform, drank alcohol in a bar, and allowed a female companion to wear his uniform shirt; photos showed alcohol and improper use of the uniform.
NOPD opened an investigation on March 2, 2011; Officer Hurst signed a Notice to Accused dated June 27, 2011 detailing sustained violations and a disciplinary hearing date.
Disciplinary hearing occurred, with an initial eight-day suspension for Rule 3 (Professional Conduct) and Rule 4 (Instructions from an Authoritative Source); Superintendent Serpas later increased the suspension by ten days for an additional Rule 3 (use of alcohol while off-duty).
Officer Hurst appealed to the Civil Service Commission; hearings were held on December 13, 2012 and March 13, 2013; he admitted factual allegations but raised timeliness and due process issues for the first time on appeal.
The Civil Service Commission denied the appeal; Hurst argues untimeliness of the investigation and lack of a pre-hearing on the additional charge; the appellate court affirms, upholding the CSC decision.
The court cites Regis v. Dep’t of Police for public-trust considerations and concludes CSC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Timeliness of investigation under La. RS 40:2531B(7) extension	Hurst argues the 60-day limit was violated	NOPD contends no extension request or opposition showed; notice indicated completion	No statutory violation; extension provision not invoked; notice deemed sufficient
Addition of administrative violation and extra suspension without pre-disciplinary hearing	Hurst claims due process violated by adding charge and days without hearing	Rule IX not applicable to suspension; stipulation covered testimony by Serpas; no mitigation offered	Not a due-process violation; proper procedures followed
Notice sufficiency and meaning of pre-disciplinary hearing notification	Notice allegedly did not clearly show completed investigation	Notice clearly identified sustained violations and scheduling; sufficient to proceed	Notice was sufficient and proper under La. RS 40:2531B(7)

Lange v. Orleans Levee Dist., 56 So.3d 925 (La. 2010) (defines 'cause' for disciplinary action and impairment standard)
AFSCME, Council #17 v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Health & Hosp., 789 So.2d 1263 (La. 2001) (preponderance standard for discipline; governing authority must prove impairment of public service)
Newman v. Dep’t of Fire, 425 So.2d 758 (La. 1983) (requires proof of occurrence of complained-of activity and impairment of operation)