Huron Mountain Club v. United States Army Corps of Engineers
545 F. App'x 390
6th Cir.2013Background
- Huron Mountain Club (HMC), owner of ~19,000 acres including an 11-mile stretch of the Salmon Trout River (STR) in Marquette County, Michigan, sought to enjoin Kennecott Eagle Minerals from constructing/operating the Eagle nickel/copper mine ~3.4 miles upstream that involves excavation beneath the STR and adjacent wetlands.
- Kennecott obtained Michigan Part 632 mining, groundwater-discharge, and air-use permits after administrative hearings and state-court review; Michigan agencies and courts found environmental harms unlikely; Kennecott commenced surface construction in 2010 and underground work in 2011.
- HMC sued federal officials under the APA and the Mandamus Act (and sought relief via the All Writs Act) to compel the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to administer RHA §10 and CWA §404 permitting (i.e., force Kennecott into federal permitting) and to require federal NEPA/NHPA/ESA reviews.
- The district court denied HMC’s motion for a preliminary injunction; HMC appealed. The Sixth Circuit reviews denial for abuse of discretion and reviews likelihood-of-success-on-merits de novo.
- The court held HMC failed to show the Corps had a nondiscretionary, discrete duty to initiate permitting or enforcement absent a permit application or a jurisdictional determination, and thus APA/mandamus relief was unavailable; derivative NEPA/NHPA/ESA claims also failed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Corps must take discrete, non-discretionary action to "administer" RHA §10 permitting absent an application | Corps has a statutory duty under RHA §10 to require permits before regulated work, so Corps must act to force permitting | RHA places burden on potential violators to obtain permits; Corps’ decision to enforce or seek applications is discretionary | No — Corps has no nondiscretionary duty to initiate permitting; APA/mandamus relief unavailable |
| Whether Corps must initiate or compel CWA §404 permitting without an application or jurisdictional determination | Corps must administer CWA §404 permitting program and force submission of permits | §404 uses discretionary language ("may issue permits"); Corps processes applications but not required to seek out violators or force applications | No — §404 is discretionary; Corps not required to compel permitting absent application/request |
| Whether agency inaction here is reviewable under Heckler v. Chaney exception (e.g., claim of lack of jurisdiction or abdication) | Corps’ inaction is effectively a jurisdictional refusal and therefore reviewable; Chaney’s footnote supports review | Chaney presumes nonenforcement decisions are committed to agency discretion; Corps has not formally declared lack of jurisdiction nor abdicated duties | No — Chaney controls; no clear discrete mandatory duty, and Corps has not affirmatively found lack of jurisdiction or clearly abdicated duties |
| Whether irreparable harm and balance of harms favor preliminary injunction against Federal Defendants/Kennecott | Environmental harms to STR and procedural NEPA/NHPA/ESA rights justify injunctive relief | State permitting and monitoring, adverse delay by HMC in bringing federal suit, and discretionary nature of federal action weigh against injunction; injuncting would impose substantial harm on Kennecott/federal interests | No — HMC failed to show likely success on merits or irreparable harm; balance of harms and public interest do not favor injunction |
Key Cases Cited
- Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (agency inaction reviewable only where a discrete, non‑ discretionary duty to act is owed)
- Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (agency decisions not to enforce generally committed to agency discretion and are presumptively unreviewable)
- Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (Sup. Ct. 2006) (discussion of Corps’ discretionary authority over discharge permits)
- McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 119 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1997) (four-factor preliminary injunction framework)
- Babler v. Futhey, 618 F.3d 514 (6th Cir. 2010) (standard of review for preliminary injunction legal conclusions)