Hurley v. Town of Southampton, 2:17-cv-05543

Background

Plaintiff Michael John Hurley owned a residence in Southampton governed by a Town Code (Ch. 270) restricting residential rentals, transient rentals, and requiring permits and tenant notifications.
Between June–July 2014 Officer Glogg issued multiple appearance tickets/criminal complaints against Hurley for alleged Town Code violations; the Town also obtained a civil injunction on July 23, 2014 prohibiting unlawful rentals.
Hurley missed a criminal-court appearance on October 2, 2015; a bench warrant was issued by Southampton Town Justice Kooperstein and Hurley was arrested on October 7, 2015 pursuant to that warrant (Officer Banks arrested him; Officers Glogg and Larios were present).
Hurley and the Town settled the civil and criminal matters by stipulation on October 27, 2015 (dismissal conditioned on payment of fines).
Hurley filed this § 1983 suit alleging false arrest and Monell municipal liability (among other claims); after a motion to dismiss, only the false arrest and Monell claims against Glogg, Larios, and the Town survived.
On summary judgment the magistrate judge recommended dismissal of both remaining claims, concluding the arrest was pursuant to a facially valid bench warrant (presumption of probable cause unrebutted) and the Monell claim failed for lack of an underlying constitutional violation and for being raised improperly at summary judgment.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
False arrest — probable cause	Hurley: the bench warrant was "invalid" because the civil injunction amounted to criminal punishment (double jeopardy/due process), so arrest lacked probable cause.	Defs: arrest followed a valid bench warrant issued by a neutral magistrate; a warrant creates a presumption of probable cause; Hurley offers no evidence of fraud/perjury or facial invalidity.	Court: Presumption of probable cause applies; Hurley failed to rebut it or show warrant was procured by fraud or facially invalid. Summary judgment for defendants.
Validity of warrant / double jeopardy theory	Hurley: the civil injunction subjected him to punishment (contempt risk), so jeopardy attached and criminal proceedings were barred, rendering the warrant invalid.	Defs: no legal support; the double jeopardy theory was not pleaded and cannot be raised anew at summary judgment.	Court: declined to consider a new double jeopardy claim raised at summary judgment; even on merits Hurley cited no authority showing the civil injunction made the warrant facially invalid.
Monell municipal liability	Hurley: Town had a policy/custom to pursue civil and criminal actions concurrently, denying double jeopardy protections.	Defs: no underlying constitutional violation; no evidence of an official policy, practice, or failure to train causing a rights deprivation.	Court: Monell claim fails because there is no proven underlying constitutional violation and the new Monell theory was not pleaded; recommend dismissal.

Key Cases Cited

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (standard for summary judgment)
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (allocating burdens on summary judgment)
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires policy/custom causing constitutional deprivation)
Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2007) (presumption of probable cause where arrest pursuant to warrant)
Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2006) (probable cause inquiry limited to facts known to arresting officer)
Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 1995) (false arrest § 1983 claim analyzed under New York law)
Gonzalez v. City of Schenectady, 728 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2013) (existence of probable cause is complete defense to false arrest)
T.L. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979) (limitations on collateral attacks to facially valid warrants)
Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845 (2d Cir. 1996) (probable cause standard in § 1983 false arrest cases)
Segal v. City of New York, 459 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 2006) (Monell does not create an independent cause of action)