Hurles v. Ryan
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13819
9th Cir.2011Background
- Hurles was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by Judge Hilliard, who alone determined the sentence in Arizona's capital scheme.
- Hurles challenged Judge Hilliard's participation in a prior special action where she defended her denial of a request for a second attorney; Arizona Court of Appeals later deemed that participation improper.
- Hurles sought post-conviction relief and federal habeas, raising judicial bias and other ineffective assistance claims, which the district court largely denied as procedurally barred.
- The Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in denying Hurles's judicial bias claim and remanded for writ relief as to the death sentence unless Arizona resentenced Hurles before a jury before a different judge, within set parameters.
- The majority declined to reach Hurles's other claims (IAC of sentencing counsel, IAC of appellate counsel, and procedural default) as moot after relief on the bias issue.
- Dissent argued the AEDPA framework required deference to the state court and would uphold the conviction and sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Judicial bias and due process | Hurles argues Judge Hilliard's adversarial role violated due process. | State argues no appearance of bias given post-hoc justifications and procedural posture. | Reversed; due process violated; remanded for new sentencing. |
| Ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel | Hurles contends failing to appoint co-counsel prejudiced sentencing. | State contends no error or harmless error given record. | Not reached; moot after bias relief. |
| Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel | Hurles asserts appellate counsel failed to raise issues/arguments properly. | State disputes asserted deficiencies and prejudice. | Not reached; moot after bias relief. |
| Procedural default related to IAC claims | Hurles argues improper procedural default handling barred relief. | State defends procedural rulings. | Not reached; moot after bias relief. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) (appearance of bias and conflicting roles in judicial proceedings)
- Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (due process requires impartiality; avoid temptations of decision-makers with conflicting roles)
- Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975) (appearance of impropriety as due process concern in judicial conduct)
- Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212 (1971) (recusal when judge becomes adversary in related proceedings)
- Caperton v. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (extreme risk of bias in highly unusual cases; due process requires recusal)
- Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (capital sentencing must involve a jury finding under contemporary due process)
- Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986) (recusal standards and appearance of bias considerations)
- Caperton (repeated citation for context), 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (see Caperton, supra note for fairness concerns in adjudication)