Hurd v. State (In re EMM), 414 P.3d 1157

DFS personally served Mother (incarcerated at Wyoming Women’s Center) with a petition to terminate parental rights on March 22, 2016; she did not respond within 20 days and the clerk entered default on April 12, 2016.
Copies of default papers and a default hearing order were mailed to Mother; she first engaged (mailed requests and sought counsel) about four months after service.
Mother received court-appointed counsel who filed a response and a motion to set aside the entry of default; the district court held a hearing on that motion.
Mother testified she misunderstood the proceeding (thought it was part of the juvenile case and that she still had counsel) but did not contact counsel or court for ~100 days after service.
The district court applied the three-factor test (prejudice to plaintiff, meritorious defense, culpable conduct) and found no excusable neglect: DFS would be prejudiced by delay, Mother offered no meritorious defense, and her delay was culpable; the court denied the motion and later terminated her parental rights by default.
Mother appealed; the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed, holding the civil three-factor test properly applies and the district court did not abuse its discretion.

Issue	Hurd's Argument	DFS's Argument	Held
Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying a motion to set aside entry of default	The three-factor W.R.C.P. 55(c)/60(b) test is unfair in termination cases because prejudice to DFS will "always" be found, effectively precluding relief	The test applies; DFS would be prejudiced by further delay, Mother lacked a meritorious defense, and her failure to respond was culpable/not excusable neglect	Affirmed. The civil three-factor test applies in termination proceedings; district court reasonably weighed factors and did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to set aside default

In re HLL, 372 P.3d 185 (Wyo. 2016) (applies civil default relief standards in termination cases and discusses prejudice from delay in permanency)
In re ARW, 343 P.3d 407 (Wyo. 2015) (standards for setting aside default under W.R.C.P.)
RDG Oil & Gas, LLC v. Jayne Morton Living Tr., 331 P.3d 1199 (Wyo. 2014) (excusable neglect standard and its demanding nature)
Multiple Resort Ownership Plan, Inc. v. Design-Build-Manage, Inc., 45 P.3d 647 (Wyo. 2002) (ignorance of procedural rules does not justify relief from default)
Fluor Daniel, Inc. v. Seward, 956 P.2d 1131 (Wyo. 1998) (relief from default under W.R.C.P. 55(c) tied to W.R.C.P. 60(b) justifications)
Halberstam v. Cokeley, 872 P.2d 109 (Wyo. 1994) (use of Rule 60(b)-based factors in assessing Rule 55(c) good cause)