499 F.Supp.3d 888
W.D. Wash.2020Background
- On June 8, 2020 SPD abandoned the East Precinct in Capitol Hill; protestors established an occupied zone known as CHAZ/CHOP covering ~16 city blocks including Cal Anderson Park.
- Plaintiffs allege the City endorsed and materially supported CHOP (providing concrete barriers, sanitation, medical supplies, lighting, and effectively ceding Cal Anderson Park) and agreed to a de‑facto "no‑response" policy for non‑life‑threatening incidents.
- Numerous violent incidents and shootings occurred in CHOP; Plaintiffs allege delayed or absent police and medical responses and that CHOP participants blocked access to businesses and residences, vandalized property, and erected encampments.
- Plaintiffs (businesses, landlords, residents) filed a FAC under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting procedural and substantive due process violations, an unlawful taking, and an equal protection claim; they sought class certification.
- The Court found Plaintiffs’ allegations sufficient to plausibly state Monell municipal liability, procedural and substantive due process claims, and a takings claim; it dismissed the equal protection claim without prejudice and denied the City’s motion to deny class certification without prejudice pending discovery.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Municipal liability (Monell causation) | City officially endorsed/supported CHOP and set policy that caused plaintiffs' injuries | City relied on discretionary policing judgments and emergency responses not amounting to municipal policy liability | Plaintiffs plausibly alleged an official policy/practice and causation; Monell claim survives dismissal |
| Procedural due process | City deprived plaintiffs of property use/access (physical occupation and blocked rights‑of‑way) without notice or opportunity to be heard | City acts were emergency policing decisions; no compensable deprivation | Court held plaintiffs plausibly alleged state‑created, state‑caused temporary deprivations of property interests and allowed the claim to proceed |
| Substantive due process (state‑created danger) | City affirmatively acted (material support and no‑response policy) and placed plaintiffs in greater danger, showing deliberate indifference | City invokes DeShaney and discretionary policing decisions; no affirmative act that worsened plaintiffs’ position | Court concluded allegations satisfy the state‑created danger framework (affirmative act, foreseeability, deliberate indifference); claim survives dismissal |
| Takings Clause (unlawful taking) | City’s actions and provision of barriers effectively occupied or denied use of plaintiffs’ property, requiring just compensation | City contends emergency policing/riot control judgments are non‑compensable and temporary incidents absent a taking | Court held plaintiffs plausibly alleged a compensable (including temporary/physical‑occupation) taking under Washington and federal takings law; claim survives dismissal |
| Equal protection | City favored CHOP areas/participants over others, disadvantaging plaintiffs | City argued plaintiffs failed to identify similarly situated control group and that rational basis review applies | Claim dismissed without prejudice for failure to plead similarly situated comparator or intentional disparate treatment |
| Class certification | Plaintiffs seek class relief based on common city policies/actions | City argued plaintiffs cannot show Rule 23 commonality/predominance on the pleadings | Court denied City’s motion to deny class certification without prejudice and deferred certification decision pending discovery |
Key Cases Cited
- Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires an official policy, custom, or practice as the moving force)
- Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012) (causation can be shown by setting in motion acts by others the government knew or should have known would cause harm)
- DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (generally no due‑process duty to protect from private violence absent special circumstances)
- Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wn.2d 586 (Wash. 1993) (physical invasion or occupation of property is compensable)
- Keiffer v. King County, 89 Wn.2d 369 (Wash. 1977) (right of access to a public right‑of‑way is a property right)
- Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (takings framework for categorical loss of use)
- Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (ad‑hoc regulatory takings factors)
- Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (permanent physical occupation is a taking)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (federal pleading standard: plausibility)
- Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (Rule 23 requires proof that common questions exist and are amenable to classwide resolution)