307 P.3d 8
Alaska Ct. App.2013Background
- Hunter was convicted of second-degree murder and evidence-tampering; primary defense was self-defense.
- Prosecutor elicited testimony from Detective Pamela Perrenoud that Hunter had a reputation for violence and from Officer Jack Carson that Hunter was an aggressive person.
- Perrenoud’s knowledge of Hunter’s reputation came from reviewing police reports and interviewing other officers; she had no personal acquaintance with Hunter.
- Carson’s opinion was based on a single, physical encounter in which Hunter allegedly fought him during an August 2006 incident.
- Defense objected under Alaska Evidence Rule 405(a) that (1) Perrenoud lacked the foundational familiarity with the community to testify about reputation and (2) Carson’s single encounter was an insufficient basis for a character opinion; the trial court admitted both witnesses’ testimony.
- The court of appeals found Perrenoud’s reputation testimony improperly admitted and reversed the murder conviction; it remanded the tampering count for further consideration by the superior court.
Issues
| Issue | Hunter's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of reputation testimony by Perrenoud under Evid. R. 405(a) | Perrenoud lacked sufficient familiarity with the community; her sources (police reports/officers) do not establish general community reputation | Perrenoud’s polling of officers and review of police contacts established Hunter’s reputation in the community at large | Reversed: Perrenoud was not qualified to testify about Hunter’s reputation; admission was erroneous |
| Whether police-officer reputation/opinion is equivalent to community reputation | Police are not the community; reputation among officers is a limited group and not general community reputation | Police are members of the community; reputation among officers reflects community reputation | Rejected State’s broad view; foundational requirement requires general, not group-specific, familiarity |
| Admissibility of Officer Carson’s opinion based on a single encounter | A single incident is an insufficient foundation for a character opinion | A striking single incident can support an opinion; trial judge should permit opinion and let cross-examination challenge it | Unresolved: trial judge failed to make the required foundational finding; may be admissible but court did not decide; error on Perrenoud alone required reversal |
| Prejudice/harmlessness: Did erroneous admission require reversal of murder conviction? | The reputation evidence was central to undermining Hunter’s self-defense claim and likely affected the verdict | (Implicit) any error was harmless given other evidence (not meaningfully briefed) | Reversed murder conviction as error likely affected the jury; remanded tampering count for further briefing/decision |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Cross, 343 S.W.2d 20 (Mo. 1961) (investigator from outside may qualify to testify on reputation only if inquiry is broad, unbiased, and systematic)
- Hernandez v. State, 800 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (reputation testimony based solely on officers’ investigatory records is not competent to prove community reputation)
- United States v. Watson, 669 F.2d 1374 (11th Cir. 1982) (discussing foundational requirements for opinion testimony about character)
- State v. Maxwell, 18 P.3d 438 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (single incident may be insufficient foundation for a character opinion depending on context)
- Love v. State, 457 P.2d 622 (Alaska 1969) (standard for assessing harmlessness of nonconstitutional error)
- People v. Bingham, 75 Ill. App. 3d 418 (Ill. App. Ct.) (community reputation testimony must be based on association and contact with the person’s friends and neighbors)