Hunter v. Philip Morris USA Inc.
364 P.3d 439
Alaska2015Background
- Benjamin Francis died of lung cancer; his estate (Hunter) sued Philip Morris for wrongful death, products liability, and fraud alleging misleading marketing of "light" cigarettes.
- Prior to trial, Philip Morris moved to exclude references to the D.C. federal court decision in United States v. Philip Morris (Judge Kessler) that found RICO violations and enjoined certain descriptors; the superior court excluded those findings as hearsay.
- At trial an Altria/Philip Morris scientist, Dr. Lipowicz, testified that "lights" were removed due to FDA/Congress; cross-examination was limited by the court’s evidentiary rulings but Hunter was allowed to use a National Cancer Institute report criticizing low-yield marketing.
- The jury found no product defect, found Philip Morris made misleading statements knowingly, but also found Francis never saw or heard any such statements and therefore returned a verdict for Philip Morris.
- Hunter moved for a new trial under Alaska R. Civ. P. 59, arguing (1) evidentiary rulings improperly restricted cross-examination and (2) the verdict was against the weight of the evidence; the superior court first granted a new trial on weight-of-evidence grounds, then reconsidered, vacated that order, and denied the new trial.
- The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the court’s evidentiary rulings but held the superior court applied an incorrect legal standard when it denied the new trial on weight-of-evidence grounds and remanded for reconsideration under the proper standard.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility/enforcement of Judge Kessler’s findings and injunction | Hunter: court should enforce/allow reference to Judge Kessler’s findings or Congress’s findings to correct jury misinformation | Philip Morris: Kessler’s findings and Congressional findings are hearsay/confusing and not binding; superior court lacks authority to enforce federal injunction | Court: Excluding Kessler’s findings was within discretion; evidentiary rulings affirmed and any error was harmless because related NCI evidence was admitted |
| Scope of cross-examination about Congressional findings/FDA ban on "light" descriptor | Hunter: cross-examination should show Congress/FDA found descriptors misleading and that Francis was exposed/reliant | Philip Morris: Congressional findings inadmissible as truth; beyond scope of witness’s testimony | Court: Limited inquiry was appropriate; Hunter could use NCI report and court did not err in limiting direct reference to Kessler/Congress |
| Whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence (new trial) — applicable standard | Hunter: Trial court properly exercised independent weighing under Kava and should grant new trial because jury finding Francis wasn’t exposed was against weight of evidence | Philip Morris: Trial court must apply more deferential appellate-standard (Mullen) and substantial evidence supports verdict; no new trial | Court: Kava standard (trial court discretion to independently weigh and grant new trial even if substantial evidence supports verdict) is the correct trial-court standard; superior court’s second/third orders misstated/merged standards and thus remand is required for renewed consideration under Kava |
| Whether appellate clear-error language ("definite and firm conviction") or "rational juror" inquiry should be part of trial standard | Hunter: Superior court’s initial de novo weighing was proper; remand if not | Philip Morris: Court should require stronger showing (plainly unreasonable/unjust) | Court: Phrases like "definite and firm conviction" are appellate/clear-error standards and should not be grafted onto trial-court Kava test; evaluating what a "reasonable juror" could believe is for directed-verdict/JNOV context, not a prerequisite to a Rule 59 new-trial under Kava |
Key Cases Cited
- Kava v. American Honda Motor Co., 48 P.3d 1170 (Alaska 2002) (trial court may independently weigh evidence and grant new trial in interest of justice even if substantial evidence supports verdict)
- Hogg v. Raven Contractors, Inc., 134 P.3d 349 (Alaska 2006) (distinguishes deferential appellate review from trial court’s Kava discretion on new-trial motions)
- Mullen v. Christiansen, 642 P.2d 1345 (Alaska 1982) (articulates the standard appellate courts use to review denial of new-trial motions)
- Sloan v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 541 P.2d 717 (Alaska 1975) (discussed in Mullen as part of appellate review standard)