Hunt v. OpenAI, Inc.
1:25-cv-00191
| D. Haw. | Sep 17, 2025Background
- Plaintiff Hunt, a Hawaii resident and AI safety advocate, seeks an injunction preventing OpenAI from offering its products in Hawai‘i until safety measures are implemented.
- FAC asserts five state-law claims against OpenAI: public nuisance (Count I), public trust doctrine (Count II), design defect product liability (Count III), failure to warn (Count IV), and negligent design (Count V).
- Plaintiff alleges Hawaii-wide harms to economy, culture, and safety from OpenAI’s AI systems and reliance on alleged regulatory inadequacies.
- OpenAI moves to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6); briefing followed and the court elected to decide without a hearing.
- Court finds lack of standing and dismisses the public trust claim; grants leave to amend Counts I, III, IV, V and denies leave for Count II; second amended complaint due by 10/8/2025.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Hunt have standing to sue? | Hunt argues specialized AI safety expertise creates a personal stake. | Standing requires injury-in-fact that is concrete, particularized, and redressable; allegations are speculative. | No standing; dismissal with leave to amend. |
| Can the public trust claim against a private entity survive? | Public trust doctrine applies to state duties and may reach government actions affecting OpenAI’s deployment. | Doctrine governs state actions; private OpenAI cannot be liable under it. | Public trust claim dismissed without leave to amend. |
| Should Counts I, III, IV, V survive with leave to amend? | Amendment could cure standing and state claims. | Standing remains fatal; some claims lack viable basis. | Counts I, III, IV, V dismissed with leave to amend; Count II dismissed without leave. |
Key Cases Cited
- Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (U.S. 2013) (threatened injury must be certainly impending)
- Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (U.S. 1992) (standing elements: injury, causation, redressability)
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (U.S. 2016) (injury must be concrete and particularized)
- Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (U.S. 2007) (standing in context of statutory procedural rights; distinguishable)
- Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674 (9th Cir. 2001) (personal stake required for standing; broad concerns insufficient)
- Johnson v. Weinberger, 851 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1988) (expertise does not confer standing)
- Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (U.S. 1972) (expertise alone not enough to confer standing as representative)
- National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 871 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1989) (general concerns insufficient to establish concrete injury)
- Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007) (political question doctrine; not reached when standing lacks)