Hunt v. Hunt, 2010 ND 231

Background

Huether was convicted by jury of gross sexual imposition and possession of child pornography after alleged acts with a child under six between 2006 and 2007.
The child resided with Huether at his Minot home; later Huether moved to Fargo but returned on weekends for months.
In June 2008 the child disclosed sexual acts to her mother and during a center interview; police entered Huether’s basement office in Minot without a warrant.
A warrant later issued to search Huether’s Minot residence; subsequently, five weeks later, officers executed a search warrant at Huether’s Fargo residence and interviewed him in a bedroom without a Miranda warning.
Huether moved to suppress evidence from the Minot office entry and the statements from Fargo; the district court denied the suppression requests.
The district court severed charges; the jury convicted Huether; Huether appeals asserting Fourth Amendment and Miranda violations and related sentencing challenges.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was entry into Huether's Minot office valid?	Huether (State) contends consent was valid because the mother had common authority over the premises.	Huether argues the mother lacked permission to enter the office; consent was not supported.	Yes; officer reasonably believed third-party consent valid; Fourth Amendment not violated.
Was incriminating statement at the Fargo house admissible without a Miranda warning?	State argues statements were voluntary and not the product of custodial interrogation requiring Miranda.	Huether contends he was in custody and later interrogated without Miranda warnings.	Statements made before officer informed of other officers were admissible; no custodial interrogation at issue.
Did the district court improperly consider an impermissible sentencing factor?	State asserts parental trust context aligns with Bell; not impermissible.	Huether argues abuse of trust in a private setting is improper.	No; consideration of a parental trust/relationship as a sentencing factor was proper.
Is the evidence sufficient to support gross sexual imposition despite no penetration?	State presented direct testimony and corroborating interview/video evidence of sexual contact.	Huether contends lack of penetration undermines the offense.	Sufficient evidence supports conviction; penetration is not required for gross sexual imposition.
Were the Fourth Amendment and Miranda issues adequately resolved on appeal?	State maintains proper application of third-party consent doctrine and custodial analysis.	Huether asserts multiple errors in suppression and custodial assessments.	District court’s rulings on suppression and Miranda-related issues were correct.

Key Cases Cited

City of Fargo v. Thompson, 520 N.W.2d 578 (N.D. 1994) (standard of review for suppression determinations)
Fischer, 2008 ND 32 (N.D. 2008) (common authority / third-party consent doctrine)
State v. Zimmerman, 529 N.W.2d 171 (N.D. 1995) (Fourth Amendment entries with consent)
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (U.S. Supreme Court 1990) (reasonableness of third party authority for consent)
City of Fargo v. Egeberg, 615 N.W.2d 542 (N.D. 2000) (custody standard and interrogation)
State v. Sabinash, 574 N.W.2d 827 (N.D. 1998) (custody analysis framework)
State v. Eldred, 564 N.W.2d 283 (N.D. 1997) (custody assessment considerations)
State v. Helmenstein, 620 N.W.2d 581 (N.D. 2000) (custody determination standard of review)
State v. Murray, 510 N.W.2d 107 (N.D. 1994) (competent evidence standard for suppression)
State v. Charette, 687 N.W.2d 484 (N.D. 2004) (sufficiency of circumstantial evidence standard)
State v. Grant, 776 N.W.2d 209 (N.D. 2009) (uncorroborated child testimony sufficiency)
State v. Skaro, 474 N.W.2d 711 (N.D. 1991) (definition of sexual contact)