HUNSUCKER v. FALLIN
408 P.3d 599
| Okla. | 2017Background
- Petitioners (four Oklahoma attorneys and licensed drivers) sought original jurisdiction to challenge S.B. 643 (Impaired Driving Elimination Act 2, "IDEA2") and the Governor’s Executive Order implementing parts of it, asserting multiple constitutional violations and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief before the Act’s Nov. 1, 2017 effective date.
- IDEA2 is a multi-section statutory overhaul addressing driver-license revocation/modification, ignition interlock requirements, breath/blood testing procedures, criminal penalties for refusal, an Impaired Driver Accountability Program (IDAP), notice requirements, and authorizations for the Department of Public Safety (DPS).
- Petitioners claimed (inter alia) IDEA2 violates the Oklahoma single-subject rule (Okla. Const. Art. V § 57) and that §13 (mandatory seizure and destruction of the physical driver license upon arrest without an administrative hearing) violates due process (Okla. Const. Art. II § 7).
- The Court found petitioners had publici juris standing to sue; it dismissed legislative leaders Schulz and McCall based on legislative immunity; and it stayed/then dissolved a prior temporary stay as its opinion took effect immediately.
- Holding: the Court concluded IDEA2 violates the single-subject rule and that §13 also violates the State Due Process Clause; the Court held the problematic provisions are not severable and therefore the Act is unconstitutional in its entirety; injunctive relief was denied as unnecessary given the invalidation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing to bring original publici juris challenge | Petitioners (attorneys) argued they have public-interest standing because IDEA2 affects many Oklahomans and their practices; exigency due to impending effective date | Respondents argued petitioners lack Article-level standing; claims are speculative, hypothetical, or third-party | Court: Petitioners have publici juris standing (discretionary) to vindicate issues of great public importance and the controversy presented a lively antagonistic conflict |
| Legislative immunity of legislative leaders | Petitioners named Senate President Pro Tempore and House Speaker as respondents, asserting official-capacity liability for single-subject violation | Schulz and McCall asserted absolute legislative immunity under Okla. Const. Art. V § 22 | Held: Legislative respondents immune; claims against them dismissed |
| Due process (Okla. Const. Art. II § 7) re: §13 (seizure and destruction of physical license upon arrest with no administrative hearing) | Petitioners: seizure+destruction of license without opportunity to challenge is arbitrary taking of property and violates due process (procedural and substantive) | Respondents: no driving privilege is revoked upon seizure; arrestee can get replacement license; DPS rules and Executive Order provide for hearings in many circumstances; seizure is regulatory/law-enforcement tool | Held: §13 violates State Due Process (arbitrary deprivation of property where no legitimate State/regulatory purpose for destruction was shown) |
| Single-subject rule (Okla. Const. Art. V § 57) for IDEA2 | Petitioners: IDEA2 embraces multiple disparate subjects (license destruction, non-impaired revocations, IDAP, bond/criminal changes, evidentiary rules, notice for non-impaired offenses) not clearly germane to a single subject | Respondents: bill’s subject is impaired driving (or broadly administrative monitoring of impaired drivers); challenged provisions relate to impaired-driving regime and are germane | Held: IDEA2 violates the single-subject rule; multiple provisions (§4, §5, §6, §11, §12, §13, §15, etc.) not germane; non-offending sections not severable; Act invalid in whole |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (U.S. 1971) (drivers’ licenses implicate property/livelihood interests requiring due process)
- Price v. Reed, 725 P.2d 1254 (Okla. 1986) (historical treatment of license seizure within a regulatory scheme and due process analysis)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (U.S. 1992) (federal standing principles: injury-in-fact, causation, redressability)
- Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125 (U.S. 2004) (limits on third-party/attorney standing to assert rights of hypothetical future clients)
- Gentges v. Oklahoma State Election Bd., 319 P.3d 674 (Okla. 2014) (publici juris / standing in challenges affecting broad classes of citizens)
- State ex rel. Howard v. Oklahoma Corporation Comm’n, 614 P.2d 45 (Okla. 1980) (permitting original proceedings and discussing when private parties may vindicate public rights)