Humphrey v. State
299 Ga. 197
Ga.2016Background
- In July 1998 Jamel Humphrey pled guilty to murder and was sentenced to life with a plea-agreement provision making him eligible for parole only after 25 years.
- In 2014 Humphrey moved to vacate his sentence; this Court in Humphrey v. State (Humphrey I) held the parole-eligibility restriction conflicted with statute and ordered that provision vacated, leaving the remainder of the sentence intact.
- Before the remittitur issued, Humphrey filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea; after remittitur the trial court vacated only the parole restriction and then summarily denied Humphrey’s motion to withdraw.
- Humphrey appealed, arguing that vacatur of the parole provision effectively restored his status to a defendant not yet sentenced and thus restored the absolute right to withdraw his plea under OCGA § 17‑7‑93(b).
- The Supreme Court considered whether partial vacatur of a sentence re‑creates an absolute right to withdraw a plea and whether the trial court had jurisdiction to hear Humphrey’s out‑of‑term motion.
Issues
| Issue | Humphrey's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether vacatur of a portion of the sentence restored Humphrey’s absolute right to withdraw his guilty plea | Humphrey: vacatur of the illegal parole restriction rendered the sentence void as to that provision and put him in same position as a defendant who pled but was not yet sentenced, thus he could withdraw his plea as of right | State: Humphrey’s plea and remaining sentence provisions remained valid; partial vacatur does not restore an absolute right to withdraw after the sentencing term has expired | Court: Partial vacatur of one provision does not reinstate an absolute right to withdraw the plea; the plea remains unwithdrawable as of right because other sentence provisions stand |
| Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain Humphrey’s out‑of‑term motion to withdraw his plea | Humphrey: (implicit) relief available despite expiration of original term because sentence was partially void | State: the motion was filed after the term of court in which Humphrey was sentenced had expired; court lacked jurisdiction | Court: Motion to withdraw was out‑of‑term and the trial court lacked jurisdiction; motion should have been dismissed rather than denied |
| Whether Humphrey’s claims that his plea was unknowing/ involuntary and that the re‑sentencing was erroneous were reviewable on direct appeal | Humphrey: raised these claims on appeal | State: these claims were not raised below and are therefore waived | Court: Claims not raised below are waived on appeal |
| Whether Humphrey’s ineffective‑assistance claim may be resolved on the record on direct appeal | Humphrey: asserts plea counsel ineffective | State: ineffective‑assistance claims often require evidentiary development | Court: Ineffectiveness cannot be resolved on this record; remedy is habeas corpus |
Key Cases Cited
- Humphrey v. State, 297 Ga. 349 (2015) (vacating only parole‑eligibility provision of Humphrey’s sentence)
- Germany v. State, 246 Ga. 455 (1980) (defendant may withdraw plea as of right before pronouncement of sentence)
- Smith v. State, 283 Ga. 376 (2008) (trial court lacks jurisdiction to entertain out‑of‑term motion to withdraw plea)
- Kaiser v. State, 285 Ga. App. 63 (2007) (Court of Appeals adopting view that vacatur of sentence may permit withdrawal of plea)
- Pierce v. State, 294 Ga. 842 (2014) (discussing availability of withdrawal after vacatur in dicta; habeas and procedural constraints may apply)
- State v. Evans, 265 Ga. 332 (1995) (withdrawal after sentence pronouncement is discretionary to correct manifest injustice)