Humberto Valdes v. City of Doral
662 F. App'x 803
| 11th Cir. | 2016Background
- Valdes was a City of Doral police lieutenant who developed anxiety/PTSD after two on-duty traumatic events; physicians eventually limited him to daytime office work only.
- After participating in internal and state investigations of fellow officers in June 2011, the Chief sought to reassign Valdes to the midnight shift; Valdes claimed the shift would worsen his condition and alleged retaliation for his statements.
- The City placed Valdes on fitness-for-duty examinations (Dec 2011 and Feb 2012) after observing symptoms; doctors initially cleared him to return only to day-office duties, then later deemed him temporarily unfit and recommended counseling and restrictions.
- Because Valdes could not perform core lieutenant duties outside the office (driving patrol car, arrests, on-scene command, court testimony), the City offered him a clerical position consistent with his restrictions; Valdes declined/took actions the City construed as resignation.
- Valdes sued under the ADA, the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for First Amendment retaliation; the district court granted summary judgment to the City, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Valdes' Argument | City of Doral's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Valdes was a "qualified individual" under the ADA/FCRA able to perform essential functions of lieutenant with reasonable accommodation | Valdes argued he could perform lieutenant duties with accommodations and pointed to prior accommodations and that much of the job was administrative | City argued ability to leave office and perform field duties is essential; Valdes' doctor restricted him to office-only work, incompatible with essential functions | Court: Valdes was not qualified because ability to work outside the office is an essential lieutenant function and his restrictions precluded that; summary judgment for City |
| Whether placement on administrative leave and fitness-for-duty exams and ultimate refusal to reinstate as lieutenant constituted adverse actions attributable to protected speech (First Amendment) | Valdes argued his statements in June 2011 and later public-records requests were protected speech and substantially motivated the City's actions (fitness exams, administrative leave, refusal to accommodate) | City argued actions were based on legitimate, non-retaliatory medical and performance concerns corroborated by physicians and records; timing and evidence do not show causation | Court: No reasonable jury could find speech was a substantial motivating factor; City would have acted the same absent speech; summary judgment for City |
| Whether certain supervisory actions (shift reminders, increased scrutiny, unit disbanding) were materially adverse | Valdes treated these as adverse acts reflecting retaliation | City treated them as routine supervisory decisions or non-actionable trivial harms | Court: Many were trivial or caused no harm; not actionable adverse actions under First Amendment standards |
| Whether City’s offer of clerical position and Valdes’ rejection equated to unlawful termination/failed accommodation | Valdes argued City failed to reasonably accommodate and effectively terminated him | City showed it offered the only position consistent with medical restrictions and that Valdes declined or missed acceptance deadlines | Court: Offer was the available accommodation; Valdes’ refusal/missed deadlines support City’s conclusion he resigned; no unlawful termination due to speech |
Key Cases Cited
- Jarvela v. Crete Carrier Corp., 776 F.3d 822 (11th Cir.) (summary judgment standard reviewed de novo)
- Mazzeo v. Color Resolutions Int’l, LLC, 746 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir.) (elements of ADA discrimination claim)
- Frazier-White v. Gee, 818 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir.) (FCRA elements mirror ADA)
- Samson v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 746 F.3d 1196 (11th Cir.) (factors for determining essential job functions)
- D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir.) (case-by-case essential-function analysis)
- Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, Ga., 112 F.3d 1522 (11th Cir.) (infrequent tasks can still be essential)
- Carter v. City of Melbourne, Fla., 731 F.3d 1161 (11th Cir.) (four-step public-employee First Amendment retaliation framework)
- Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (U.S.) (public concern threshold for protected speech)
- Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (U.S.) (balancing employee speech vs. government interest)
- Battle v. Bd. of Regents for Ga., 468 F.3d 755 (11th Cir.) (First Amendment protection stages and legal/vs-factual allocation)
- Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961 (11th Cir.) (materially adverse action standard)
- Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (U.S.) (retaliation protects against materially adverse actions, not trivial harms)
- Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir.) (administrative leave as adverse action—contrasting authority)
- Nichols v. S. Ill. Univ.-Edwardsville, 510 F.3d 772 (7th Cir.) (administrative leave may not be materially adverse)
- Trask v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 822 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir.) (reassignment adverse-action analysis)
- Hurlbert v. St. Mary’s Health Care Sys., Inc., 439 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir.) (termination is an adverse employment action)
- Stanley v. City of Dalton, Ga., 219 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir.) (factors for causation and pretext in retaliation cases)
- Vila v. Padrón, 484 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir.) (defendant’s burden to show same-action defense)