Background

• Police executed a search warrant at Hughitt’s home and found methamphetamine residue, about 1 gram of meth, drug paraphernalia, scales, packaging, cash, and other items.
• Hughitt was indicted for engaging in organized criminal activity (Tex. Penal Code §71.02) with the predicate offense alleged as possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.
• Hughitt moved to quash the indictment arguing possession with intent to deliver is not a predicate offense under §71.02(a)(5); the trial court denied the motion, a jury convicted her, and she received an 18‑year sentence.
• The court of appeals reversed, holding that the phrase “unlawful manufacture, delivery … of a controlled substance” in §71.02(a)(5) does not encompass the distinct offense of possession with intent to deliver, and it vacated the engaging conviction and dismissed the indictment.
• The State sought discretionary review; the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the court of appeals, holding the plain meaning of “manufacture” and “delivery” requires acts beyond mere possession with intent to deliver and therefore possession with intent to deliver is not a §71.02(a)(5) predicate.
• The Court also dismissed an erroneously included cause (PD‑0276‑18) as improvidently granted.

Issues

Key Cases Cited

• Nichols v. State, 653 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (construing §71.02(a)(5) references to offenses in the Controlled Substances Act in vagueness context)
• Lopez v. State, 108 S.W.3d 293 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (explaining inclusion of thwarted transfers in delivery prosecutions)
• Guerrero v. State, 305 S.W.3d 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (plurality noting differing statutory focus of manufacturing vs. possession‑with‑intent offenses)
• Cornet v. State, 359 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (legislature demonstrates how it specifies cross‑references when intended)
• Shipp v. State, 331 S.W.3d 433 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (statutory text is the best indicator of legislative intent)