Hughes v. Moyer
156 A.3d 770
| Md. | 2017Background
- Laura Lynn Hughes, a DPSCS Parole and Probation Agent, was terminated after a positive drug test and received a written Notice of Termination.
- The Notice informed her of a 15-day right to file a first-tier appeal to the Secretary of DPSCS but did not mention the second-tier appeal to the Secretary of DBM or that silence by the agency would be deemed a denial.
- Hughes timely mailed a first-tier appeal; the Secretary of DPSCS did not respond within 15 days and never issued a written decision.
- Nearly a year later, after retaining counsel and receiving no agency response, Hughes filed a petition for writ of mandamus in Baltimore County Circuit Court seeking relief and a written first-tier decision.
- The Circuit Court dismissed, relying on Fisher v. Eastern Correctional Institution (425 Md. 699), which held that an unanswered first-tier appeal is deemed denied after 15 days and triggers a 10-day deadline to seek second-tier review.
- The Court of Appeals granted certiorari and evaluated (1) whether Fisher should be reconsidered and (2) whether the statutory notice requirement (SPP §11-106(a)(5)) compelled fuller notice of the second-tier deadline and the effect of silence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Fisher v. Eastern Correctional Institution should be overruled so that an employee may invoke second-tier review late when the agency fails to issue a written first-tier decision | Hughes urged Fisher be reconsidered on due process grounds and would forgive a belated second-tier appeal when the agency is silent | DPSCS relied on Fisher and the deemed-denial scheme in SPP §11-108(b)(2) to assert strict deadlines | Court declined to overrule Fisher; deemed-denial after 15 days stands and triggers the 10-day second-tier deadline |
| Whether the Notice of Termination complied with SPP §11-106(a)(5) — i.e., whether the agency must notify of the second-tier appeal and the significance of agency silence | Hughes argued the notice was inadequate because it failed to inform her of the second-tier hearing right and that silence at first tier would trigger the second-tier deadline | DPSCS argued notice of the immediately available first-tier appeal was sufficient; second-tier rights were statutory and publicly available, so employees are presumed to know the law | Court held SPP §11-106(a)(5) requires meaningful notice that there are two tiers, that the second tier provides an opportunity for a hearing, and that silence at first tier triggers the deadline to invoke the second tier |
| Whether failure to provide fuller notice excuses non-exhaustion of administrative remedies (i.e., whether Hughes may seek judicial relief despite failing to timely pursue second-tier review) | Hughes contended inadequate notice prevented timely second-tier pursuit and so she should not be barred by deemed acceptance | DPSCS argued Hughes failed to exhaust the administrative remedy and is therefore precluded from judicial relief | Court refused to dismiss on exhaustion grounds as circular here; remanded to permit consideration of whether Hughes should be allowed to pursue second-tier review or whether other defenses (e.g., laches) bar relief |
| Appropriate remedy when notice is inadequate | Hughes sought reinstatement and a first-tier decision via mandamus | DPSCS sought dismissal and maintained procedural bar defenses | Court vacated dismissal and remanded for further proceedings: agency must give meaningful notice and court to determine whether Hughes may invoke second-tier review or other defenses apply; did not order substantive relief now |
Key Cases Cited
- Fisher v. Eastern Correctional Institution, 425 Md. 699 (Md. 2012) (interpreting SPP §§11-108(b)(2) and 11-109(e)(2): unanswered first-tier appeal is deemed denied after 15 days, triggering the 10-day second-tier deadline)
- Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (U.S. 1985) (property interest in public employment requires due-process protections, including opportunity for hearing)
- Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (U.S. 1950) (notice must be reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties and enable choice to appeal or default)
- Benik v. Hatcher, 358 Md. 507 (Md. 2000) (discussing the presumption that individuals know the law)