Hughes v. Dakota Mill & Grain, 959 N.W.2d 903

Claimant Taylor Hughes had prior lumbar surgeries (2011) and intermittent back treatment but reported no symptoms on a 2017 pre-employment physical.
Employed by Dakota Mill & Grain in 2017 performing heavy labor (jackhammer, concrete work, landscaping) and worked 50–60 hours/week.
On June 22, 2017 Hughes exited a Bobcat, felt sore, told his supervisor and office manager, and thereafter performed only light duty that day and the next.
On June 26 Hughes’s legs collapsed; emergency records list onset June 26 and MRI showed increased L4–5 herniation versus earlier films; he received injections and conservative care with surgery as an option.
Two medical experts: Dr. MacDougall (claimant’s) opined work could be a major contributing cause; Dr. Shumaker (employer’s) could not conclude work was the major cause and relied on a June 26 onset.
The Department denied benefits (finding claimant not credible and applying an incorrect causation standard); the circuit court reversed; the Supreme Court affirmed the reversal, finding Hughes proved compensable injury and that work was a major contributing cause.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the injury arose out of and in the course of employment	Hughes: work activities (heavy labor and June 22 event) contributed to injury; co‑workers corroborate soreness	Dakota Mill: medical records and ER report show onset June 26; claimant’s version inconsistent and not proven	Court: Affirmed — on proper "contributing factor" standard Hughes met preponderance; co‑worker testimony, work duties, and records support causation
Whether work was a "major contributing cause" given preexisting condition	Hughes: work activities materially aggravated preexisting condition and are a major contributing cause	Dakota Mill: expert says cannot medically establish work as major cause; Department applied a strict (and incorrect) threshold	Court: Affirmed reversal — Dept used wrong definition; de novo review favors claimant’s expert (MacDougall); work was "a" major contributing cause

Darling v. W. River Masonry, Inc., 777 N.W.2d 363 (standard for reviewing Department factual findings)
Orth v. Stoebner & Permann Constr., Inc., 724 N.W.2d 586 (employment must be a contributing factor to arise out of employment)
Bender v. Dakota Resorts Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 700 N.W.2d 739 (definition of "in the course of" employment—time, place, circumstances)
Peterson v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, 816 N.W.2d 843 (work need be "a" major contributing cause, not the sole cause)
Holscher v. Valley Queen Cheese Factory, 713 N.W.2d 555 (causation is a factual issue for the Department)
Smith v. Stan Houston Equip. Co., 836 N.W.2d 647 (claimant not required to prove employment was proximate, direct, or sole cause)
Johnson v. Albertson’s, 610 N.W.2d 449 (value of expert opinion depends on the accuracy/completeness of its factual foundation)