Huff, Donald
PD-0763-15
| Tex. App. | Jul 9, 2015Background
- In August 2009 Huff was involved in a motorcycle crash that killed his passenger; Huff was arrested and later indicted for felony murder (underlying felony: third-offense DWI).
- At the hospital Huff refused voluntary testing; Officer Peeler ordered a warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw under Tex. Transp. Code § 724.012(b); the blood test later showed a BAC of 0.17.
- Huff moved to suppress the blood-test evidence after the Supreme Court decided Missouri v. McNeely; the trial court denied suppression, admitted the blood results, and Huff was convicted and sentenced to 45 years.
- On appeal the Fourth Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding § 724.012(b) does not authorize a per se warrantless nonconsensual blood draw and that McNeely requires exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless blood draw; the court found no exigency and excluded the blood evidence as requiring suppression.
- The court of appeals affirmed the verdict on sufficiency, denied Huff’s IADA dismissal and constitutional speedy-trial claims, but concluded the erroneous admission of the BAC evidence was not harmless and ordered a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Huff's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lawfulness of a warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw under Tex. Transp. Code § 724.012(b) (Fourth Amendment) | § 724.012(b) authorizes reasonable searches in these circumstances and the Court should resolve consistently with related petitions (Weems, Douds, Cole) | The statute cannot override the Fourth Amendment; McNeely requires case-by-case totality/exigency analysis | Court of Appeals: § 724.012(b) does not dispense with the warrant requirement; McNeely controls — warrantless mandatory draws require exigent circumstances; suppression warranted |
| Exigent‑circumstances analysis applied by the lower courts | Officer conduct should be judged objectively; courts should analyze the totality of circumstances and may remand for proper exigency review | The officer admitted there were no exigent circumstances; routine practice cannot substitute for exigency | Court of Appeals: No exigent circumstances shown; officer admitted he did not seek a warrant because it was not standard procedure; exigency not satisfied |
| Good‑faith exception / admissibility under article 38.23 if statute later deemed insufficient | Officer reasonably relied upon the then-operative statute; article 38.23 should be construed to avoid excluding probative evidence obtained under a statutory mandate | Statute does not dispense with warrant requirement; good‑faith reliance on it is not a recognized basis under Texas law to admit evidence | Court of Appeals: Good‑faith exception does not apply; § 38.23 does not create an exception for reliance on a statutory provision that does not displace the Fourth Amendment |
| Other procedural claims: sufficiency of evidence, IADA dismissal, constitutional speedy trial | State argued evidence (admissions, scene evidence, ownership, expert testimony) and procedural compliance were sufficient | Huff argued corpus delicti insufficiency, IADA noncompliance entitled to dismissal, and constitutional speedy‑trial violation | Court of Appeals: Overruled Huff on corpus delicti (sufficiency); IADA dismissal denied (Huff failed to follow procedural requirements); no constitutional speedy‑trial violation (Barker balance favored State) |
Key Cases Cited
- Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (Supreme Court) (reasonableness standard allows some mistakes by officers)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (Supreme Court) (four‑factor speedy‑trial balancing test)
- Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (Supreme Court) (good‑faith reliance on statute may justify admission under federal exclusionary‑rule analysis)
- Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (Supreme Court) (exclusionary rule is a last resort; courts should avoid exclusion where possible)
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (Supreme Court) (subjective intent of officer is irrelevant to objective Fourth Amendment analysis)
- Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (Supreme Court) (dissipation of alcohol does not create a per se exigency; exigency must be assessed under the totality of circumstances)