Hudson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole
204 A.3d 392
Pa.2019Background
- In 1978 Hudson burglarized a home, shot two people, and was convicted of second-degree murder and related offenses; he received a mandatory life sentence for second-degree murder and a consecutive 15–30 year term on other counts, which he completed in 2009.
- In 2017 Hudson applied for parole; the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole denied review because his life sentence had no minimum date and the Board lacks authority to parole those serving life imprisonment.
- Hudson petitioned the Commonwealth Court, arguing that (1) under Commonwealth v. Ulbrick a sentencing omission implies a one‑day minimum, making him parole‑eligible, and (2) Castle v. PBPP was wrongly decided and should be overruled.
- The Commonwealth Court sustained the Board’s demurrer and dismissed Hudson’s petition; Hudson appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
- The Supreme Court considered statutory text and construction: whether sentencing statutes require or permit a minimum parole date for mandatory life terms for second‑degree murder and whether the Board has authority to parole such inmates.
- The Court concluded that statutory structure and 61 Pa.C.S. § 6137(a)(1) preclude the Board from paroling inmates serving mandatory life sentences for second‑degree murder, and therefore affirmed dismissal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Hudson) | Defendant's Argument (PBPP/State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a life sentence for 2nd‑degree murder requires or permits a minimum parole‑eligibility date when none was specified | Ulbrick implies a one‑day minimum where sentencing court omitted a required minimum; Section 9756(c) does not exclude life sentences, so legislature intended parole possibility | Section 9756(b)'s minimum‑of‑half rule cannot apply to life sentences; Board lacks statutory authority to parole inmates serving life under § 6137(a)(1) | Life sentence for 2nd‑degree murder is not subject to § 9756(b) minimum calculation and Board lacks power to parole such inmates; petition dismissed |
| Whether differences in statutory phrasing (some life provisions say “without parole”) imply parole is available for ordinary 2nd‑degree murder life sentences | Absence of explicit “without parole” language in § 1102(b) indicates legislature intended parole possibility | Context and other statutes show life imprisonment is qualitatively different; legislature can and does state no‑parole when intended; § 6137 governs Board power | Differences in phrasing are not dispositive; § 6137(a)(1) plainly prohibits Board from paroleing those serving life imprisonment |
| Whether Ulbrick controls where sentence imposed is life rather than a flat term of years | Ulbrick supports presuming a minimal term when court omits required minimum | Ulbrick addressed flat term of years; life sentence is qualitatively different (terminates at death) and cannot be given a half‑maximum minimum | Ulbrick is distinguishable; mandatory life sentences cannot be assigned a lawful numeric minimum under § 9756(b) |
| Whether the Board may grant parole as a matter of agency power despite sentencing omission | Hudson: statutory scheme and omissions create a reviewable right to parole consideration | Board: an administrative agency may act only within clear legislative grant; § 6137(a)(1) excludes those serving life imprisonment | Board lacks authority to parole inmates serving mandatory life; administrative power is limited to statutory grant |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Ulbrick, 462 Pa. 257, 341 A.2d 68 (1975) (presumed one‑day minimum where court imposed a flat term of years but omitted required minimum)
- Castle v. PBPP, 123 Pa. Cmwlth. 570, 554 A.2d 625 (1989) (held life sentence for second‑degree murder precludes parole eligibility)
- Brenizer v. Commonwealth, 477 Pa. 534, 384 A.2d 1218 (1978) (Board lacks authority to parole those serving life imprisonment)
- Rogers v. PBPP, 555 Pa. 285, 724 A.2d 319 (1999) (parole is a discretionary act of mercy, not a right)
- Brittingham v. Commonwealth, 442 Pa. 241, 275 A.2d 83 (1971) (parolee remains in legal custody and parole is penological discipline)
- Bronson v. PBPP, 491 Pa. 549, 421 A.2d 1021 (1980) (Board is an administrative agency constrained to powers granted by statute)