107 So. 3d 712
La. Ct. App.2012Background
- Death allegedly from a bar parking lot altercation; decedent Hudson died from brain injuries after assault by Cox.
- Mother Dayna Hudson filed wrongful death/survival suit against Jager Bomb, LLC and insurer FFIC; trial court granted summary judgment for FFIC based on assault-and-battery exclusion.
- FFIC moved for summary judgment arguing claims were barred by assault-and-battery and liquor-liability exclusions; plaintiff and bar defendants opposed.
- Trial court held the assault-and-battery exclusion clearly excluded coverage and pretermitted liquor-liability exclusion review.
- Plaintiff appeals the ruling; appellate standard of review for summary judgments discussed; policy language and construction reviewed.
- FFIC policy excludes assault and battery-related bodily injury, with definitions of assault and battery used to interpret coverage, leading to affirmance of dismissal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is FFIC's assault-and-battery exclusion dispositive of coverage? | Hudson contends exclusion may be ambiguous and not cover extraordinary injuries. | FFIC asserts exclusion clearly excludes injuries arising from assault or battery. | Yes; exclusion clearly excludes coverage. |
| Is the policy language ambiguous due to the 'or' between provisions? | Hudson argues removal of 'or' creates ambiguity altering coverage. | FFIC maintains language unambiguous and properly read. | No ambiguity; exclusion unambiguous. |
| Should plain meaning govern policy construction here? | Hudson seeks additional interpretive rules due to alleged ambiguity. | FFIC argues plain meaning controls; no ambiguity detected. | Plain meaning governs; no ambiguity. |
| Is summary judgment appropriate on coverage despite liability issues? | Hudson asserts there are unresolved facts beyond coverage terms. | FFIC argues no genuine issue on the coverage issue. | Yes; summary judgment proper on coverage. |
Key Cases Cited
- Jones v. Yacht Club, 682 So.2d 816 (La.App.3d Cir. 1996) (policy language read disjunctively; exclusion applies to battery.)
- Brown v. Yacht Club, 685 So.2d 670 (La.App.3d Cir. 1996) (use of 'or' created disjunctive reading supporting exclusion.)
- Gaspard v. Northfield Insurance Company, 649 So.2d 979 (La.App.3d Cir. 1994) (exclusion read as separate clauses; no ambiguity.)
- Straughter v. Hodnett, 975 So.2d 81 (La.App.2d Cir. 2008) (assault-and-battery exclusion applied to bar patron injury.)
- Washington v. Spurlock, 703 So.2d 1378 (La.App.4th Cir. 1997) (assault-and-battery exclusion applicable despite premises-defect claims.)
- Cortinez v. Handford, 490 So.2d 626 (La.App.2d Cir. 1986) (bar patron injuries under assault-and-battery exclusion.)
- Maise v. Cat’s Meow, Inc., 683 So.2d 846 (La.App.4th Cir. 1996) (exclusion applied irrespective of fault theories.)
- Proshee v. Shree, Inc., 893 So.2d 939 (La.App.3d Cir. 2005) (exclusion applies in hotel/bar settings. Employs broad scope.)